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Abstract 
The fragmentation of production across borders allows firms to make and export final goods, or to perform only 
intermediate stages of production by processing imported inputs for re-exporting. We examine how financial 
frictions affect companies’ choice between processing and ordinary trade – implicitly a choice of production 
technology and position in global supply chains – and how this decision affects performance. We exploit matched 
customs and balance-sheet data from China, where exports are classified as ordinary trade, import-and-assembly 
processing trade (processing firm sources and pays for imported inputs), and pure-assembly processing trade 
(processing firm receives foreign inputs for free). Value added, profits and profitability rise from pure assembly to 
processing with imports to ordinary trade. However, more profitable trade regimes require more working capital 
because they entail higher up-front costs. As a result, credit constraints induce firms to conduct more processing 
trade and pure assembly in particular, and preclude them from pursuing higher value-added, more profitable 
activities. Financial market imperfections thus impact the organization of production across firms and countries, 
and inform optimal trade and development policy in the presence of global production networks. 
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1    Introduction 
The decline in transportation costs and policy barriers over the last few decades has revolutionized global 
trade by enabling the splicing of production across borders. Firms today can choose to perform only 
intermediate segments of the supply chain by processing and assembling imported inputs, before re-
exporting to final producers and retailers abroad. According to the International Labor Organization, 60 
million workers worldwide are employed in 3,500 export processing zones spanning 130 mostly 
developing countries (Boyenge 2007). This phenomenon raises important, policy-relevant questions. 
How should trade policy be designed when different manufacturing stages occur in different nations? 
What are the welfare and distributional effects of processing trade and the policies that govern it? Does 
it shape technology transfer to emerging economies and the transmission of shocks between countries? 
To shed light on these questions, we study how firms choose between processing and ordinary 
trade – implicitly a choice of production technology and position in global supply chains – and how this 
decision affects company performance. We show that spanning more production stages via ordinary 
trade increases value added and profitability. However, it also requires more working capital because it 
entails higher up-front costs. As a result, financial frictions induce firms to conduct more processing 
trade, and preclude them from pursuing higher value-added, more profitable activities. At the same time, 
processing trade enables constrained firms that could not undertake ordinary exports to share in the gains 
from trade. Financial market imperfections thus affect the organization of production across firms and 
countries, and inform the design of trade and development policy in the presence of global value chains. 
We use matched customs and balance-sheet data at the firm level for China, an economy ideally 
suited to this analysis because of its major role in international production networks. To boost exports, 
in the mid 1980s China formally introduced a processing trade regime (PT) that exempts materials 
imported for further processing and re-exporting from import duties. By 2005, 32.7% of Chinese 
exporters pursued processing trade and contributed 54.6% of total exports. In addition, Chinese firms 
choose between two operating modes within the processing regime. Under pure assembly (PA), they 
receive foreign inputs at no cost from the trade partner abroad to whom they also send the final product. 
Under processing with imports (PI), also known as import-and-assembly, the Chinese firm instead 
independently sources and pays for imported parts. These institutional features introduce wedges 
between the costs and returns associated with ordinary trade (OT), PI and PA. Finally, China’s financial 
system is underdeveloped and segmented across provinces. It thus provides a perfect setting for 
exploring the link between credit constraints and firms’ choice of export mode. 
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We establish two main results. First, profitability varies systematically across trade strategies. 
Profits, profit-to-sales ratios and value added are higher for companies that undertake more ordinary 
relative to processing trade, and more import-and-assembly relative to pure assembly. Producers settling 
for PA or PI must therefore face some constraint that prevents them from doing OT. 
Second, limited access to capital poses such a constraint and determines exporters’ choice of 
trade regime. We first demonstrate that (i) in the cross-section of firms within finely disaggregated 
industries, financially healthier enterprises with more liquid assets and less leverage pursue more 
ordinary trade relative to processing trade, and more import-and-assembly relative to pure assembly. 
Moreover, (ii) within continuing exporters over time, improvements in financial health are followed by 
reallocations of trade activity towards regimes with higher working capital needs. Similarly, new 
exporters' financial health prior to export entry strongly predicts their trade regime upon entry. 
Since (i) and to a lesser degree (ii) may arise endogenously, we exploit a series of exogenous 
sources of variation to establish a causal effect of credit constraints. We show that (iii) following the 
removal of MFA quotas on textiles and apparel in 2005, new exporters of such products choose different 
trade modes depending on their financial status before 2005. (iv) Across sectors within firms, exporters 
conduct more OT than PT and more PI than PA in financially less vulnerable sectors, i.e. sectors that 
rely less on external capital markets for exogenous reasons. (v) The impact of firms' financial health and 
sectors' financial vulnerability is bigger in Chinese provinces with weaker financial systems, where 
liquidity constraints are more likely to bind for the Chinese exporter. By contrast, this impact is stronger 
for financially more developed export destinations, where the foreign partner is less constrained and can 
more easily bear the costs that the Chinese seller cannot. 
These empirical findings are consistent with liquidity needs and profitability varying across trade 
regimes, such that financial frictions shape firms’ choice of export mode. Conceptually, different trade 
regimes correspond to a different distribution of production stages, costs and profits between Chinese 
suppliers and foreign buyers. From the perspective of the Chinese manufacturer, ordinary trade requires 
the most working capital because he pays for product design, domestic and foreign inputs, import duties 
on foreign inputs, final assembly, and distribution abroad. Processing with imports necessitates less 
financial liquidity, since it avoids the costs of product design, import tariffs, and distribution. Financing 
needs are lowest under pure assembly, when upfront expenses comprise only domestic inputs and 
product assembly. When the costs borne by each party represent relationship-specific investments and 
contracts are incomplete, hold-up problems arise and trade partners split revenues according to Nash 
bargaining with their contribution to the relationship as bargaining weight. Chinese firms thus sort into 
trade modes based on their access to capital, and this in turn pins down their profitability. 
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Our analysis uncovers an important and previously unexplored determinant of firms’ export 
mode: credit constraints. The recent literature has proposed other factors that govern the choice between 
processing and ordinary trade in the Chinese context. These include firm productivity (Brandt and 
Morrow 2015, Dai et al. 2011, Defever and Riaño 2012), space-based industrial policies (Defever and 
Riaño 2012), import tariffs (Brandt and Morrow 2015), and incentives for foreign firms to vertically 
integrate their Chinese supplier (Feenstra and Hanson 2005, Fernandes and Tang 2012). We use a variety 
of estimation strategies in order to account for these alternative factors, as well as for other observable 
and unobservable firm and sector characteristics. We control for the variation in aggregate supply and 
demand conditions with a stringent combination of firms’ province, industry, and destination fixed 
effects, and for unobserved company characteristics with firm fixed effects. We establish that the role 
of firms’ financial health is independent from that of various key firm characteristics such as size, age, 
productivity, ownership structure (private vs. state, domestic vs. foreign), production technology 
(capital, skill, and material intensity), and tariffs on imported inputs. Of note, its effect is economically 
large relative to that of firm productivity, which is weakly correlated with firms' access to capital due to 
frictions in Chinese financial markets. We ensure that our results for sectors’ financial vulnerability are 
not driven by the variation in physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, relationship specificity, 
and upstream import tariffs across sectors. 
Our findings suggest that financial frictions influence the organization of global production 
networks across firm and country boundaries. The three trade regimes correspond to the integration of 
different segments of the value chain (product design, input sourcing, input processing, final assembly, 
distribution) under the control of the Chinese exporter. Credit constrained firms, and presumably 
financially underdeveloped countries as a whole, might be stuck in low value-added stages of the supply 
chain and unable to pursue more profitable opportunities. Strengthening capital markets might thus be 
an important prerequisite for moving into higher value-added, more profitable activities. While our 
estimates may not capture general equilibrium effects, back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that 
these effects can be sizable: Improving firms' financial health to that of the least constrained firm in our 
sample would increase aggregate Chinese profits by 5.2 billion RMB (0.5%) and real value added by 15 
billion RMB (0.3%). 
Our study provides a bridge between two active literatures on trade and finance and on global 
value chains. There is growing evidence that credit constraints impede firms' export activity and distort 
aggregate trade flows, both in normal times and during crisis episodes (Foley and Manova 2015, Manova 
2013, Berman and Héricourt 2010, Bricongne et al. 2012, Amiti and Weinstein 2011, Minetti and Zhu 
2011, Chor and Manova 2012, Feenstra et al. 2011). We propose a novel mechanism – choice of trade 
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regime and implicitly global value chain position – through which credit constraints operate. There has 
also been increased interest in international production networks and their implications for the 
transmission of shocks across borders during the 2008-2009 crisis (Bems et al. 2011, Levchenko et al. 
2010, Baldwin 2012).1 An important advance in this area has been the inference of domestic value added 
and production line position from trade flows and input-output tables at the country level (Johnson and 
Noguera 2012, Antràs and Chor 2013, Fally 2011) and in China in particular (Brandt and Morrow 2015, 
Kee and Tang 2012, Koopman et al. 2011). To this line of research we add one of the first micro-level 
studies of how and why individual firms operate at different stages along the global value chain. We 
also shift attention to the decisions of Southern firms, rather than those of Northern manufacturers 
looking to relocate production to the low-cost South.2 
Our analysis illustrates how liquidity constraints shape the design of international trade 
contracts. Compared to OT and PI, PA is a codified form of trade credit extended by the foreign buyer 
to the Chinese supplier for the purpose of financing imported inputs. Our paper thus extends previous 
work on the use of trade credit in cross-border transactions (Antràs and Foley 2011) and on the effect of 
financial frictions on multinationals' decision to off-shore intra-firm or at arm's length (Antràs et al. 
2009, Manova et al. 2015, Javorcik and Spatareanu 2009). 
Finally, our conclusions shed light on the gains from trade and the role of trade policy in the 
presence of processing trade and global supply chains. Our results reinforce recent evidence that 
facilitating access to imported materials can boost the export performance of developing countries by 
enabling manufacturers to improve product quality and to broaden product scope (Kugler and Verhoogen 
2009, 2012, Goldberg et al. 2010, Manova and Zhang 2012). This is particularly relevant for economies 
that rely on trade for growth and knowledge spillovers. Our findings further suggest that the international 
fragmentation of production and its institutionalization with the processing regime in China allow 
liquidity constrained firms to share in the gains from trade, when they could not have done so otherwise. 
This highlights the differential effects of trade policy and global value chains across heterogeneous firms 
in a world with financial market imperfections. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides institutional 
background on China’s trade regimes. Section 3 outlines the conceptual framework that guides our 
empirical analysis. We introduce the data in Section 4, and present the empirical results in Section 5. 
The last section concludes. 
1 Kim and Shin (2012) model global supply chains with production delays and show that inventories, accounts receivable 
and productivity are procyclical and track financial conditions. 
2 See for example Helpman (1984), Hanson et al. (2005), and Yeaple (2003). 
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2    Institutional Background 
For the past 30 years, China has used a variety of trade policy instruments to stimulate export activity. 
A particularly consequential intervention has been the establishment of a designated trade regime that 
exempts imported inputs from import duty as long as they are used for further processing, assembly and 
ultimately re-exporting on behalf of foreign buyers. In place since the mid-1980s, this provision 
encourages the formation of processing-trade relationships between local firms and overseas companies 
looking to offshore production to China. 
The Chinese customs authorities thus distinguish between two carefully enforced trade regimes: 
processing trade (PT) and ordinary trade (OT).3 Processing trade is formally defined as "business 
activities in which the operating enterprise imports all or part of the raw or ancillary materials, spare 
parts, components, and packaging materials, and re-exports finished products after processing or 
assembling these materials/parts". A firm conducting processing trade can claim import-duty exemption 
only if, at the time of importing, it shows proof of a contractual agreement with a foreign buyer to whom 
it will export the processed goods. 
Processing trade comprises two sub-categories: processing with imports (PI) and pure assembly 
(PA). Pure assembly is also known as processing with foreign-client supplied materials. It refers to 
"business activities in which the operating enterprise receives materials/parts from a foreign enterprise 
without needing to pay foreign exchange for the import, and carries out processing or assembling with 
the materials/parts as per the requirements of the foreign enterprise, only charging for the processing or 
assembling, while any finished products are to be sold and marketed by the foreign enterprise." By 
contrast, processing with imports, also known as processing with imported materials or import-and-
assembly, refers to "business activities in which the operating enterprise imports materials/parts by 
paying foreign exchange for their processing, and exports finished processed products for sale abroad". 
In other words, under both types of processing trade, the import duty is waived, the Chinese 
party pays for domestic inputs and labor and customizes the product to the specifications of the foreign 
buyer, and the foreign buyer handles product design, marketing and distribution. However, under PA, 
the Chinese firm is not responsible for sourcing foreign materials and incurs no cost for using them. 
Under PI on the other hand, it decides what parts to source, from which countries, and at what prices. It 
also has to pay for any imported inputs. The foreign input suppliers are typically not the same party to 
3 There are a number of other regimes that capture less than 4% of exports (e.g. warehousing trade, entrepôt trade by 
bonded area, international aid, barter trade). All regime definitions are from "Measures of the Customs of the People's 
Republic of China on the Control of Processing-Trade Goods" released in 2004 and amended in 2008 and 2010. 
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whom the Chinese firm ultimately exports. From a contractual perspective, whoever purchases a given 
input preserves ownership rights over it until the processing transaction has been completed. 
Firms exporting under ordinary trade often manufacture exclusively with local inputs, but they 
are allowed to combine foreign and domestic materials and to sell both at home and abroad. This makes 
it prohibitively difficult for Chinese customs to ascertain what fraction of any imported inputs go towards 
production for exporting, especially when the Chinese company exports under its own brand name. 
Ordinary exporters thus always incur import tariffs on any foreign intermediates they use. 
A Chinese manufacturer may legally undertake both ordinary and processing trade, in which 
case each of its import and export transactions is recorded and treated separately according to its 
specified trade regime.4 For example, a garment maker may use imported materials in order to sell 
domestically under its own brand (e.g. Youngor) as well as to export abroad under a foreign brand (e.g. 
Nike, Gap). It would then enjoy the import tariff waiver on its processing imports but not on the foreign 
inputs it acquired for domestic production. 
The introduction of the processing trade regime has significantly contributed to the expansion in 
China's trade activity. In 2005 – the year our empirical analysis focuses on – 54.6% of all exports by 
value represented processing trade. While China's import duties have declined over time, the exemption 
for processing imports remains important: Average tariff rates dropped from 41% in 1992 to 16.8% 
before entry into the WTO in 2001 and reached 9% in 2005 (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci 2004, Yu 2013). 
3    Conceptual Framework 
Chinese firms can choose among three export modes if they engage in international trade: ordinary trade, 
processing with imports, and pure assembly. We posit that the institutionalized differences among trade 
regimes generate a trade-off between ex-ante costs and ex-post profits: From the perspective of the 
Chinese company, more profitable export modes are associated with higher up-front expenditures. A 
financially unconstrained firm would thus be able to conduct the most profitable activity, while a firm 
with limited access to capital would be forced into less profitable trade regimes with lower liquidity 
needs. Credit constraints thus directly affect firms’ export strategy and implicitly their production 
technology as well. In this section, we provide intuition for these economic forces in order to develop 
empirically testable hypotheses; we present a stylized theoretical model in a companion working paper. 
4 On the import side, ordinary imports include final consumption goods, intermediates used in production for the 
domestic market, and intermediates used in production for foreign markets by firms exporting under the OT regime. 
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Consider a Chinese firm that observes foreign demand for a given product, such as a toy doll. 
Manufacturing and selling this product requires multiple activities: product design, input sourcing, input 
assembly, marketing and distribution abroad. Each of these activities entails up-front costs that must be 
incurred before any sales and payoffs are realized. Moreover, not all required inputs are available 
domestically. For example, plastic molds, paints and hair might have to be imported because local 
suppliers either lack the technological know-how to make them or cannot meet the quality standards of 
foreign consumers. Conversely, malleable plastic, cloth for the doll’s dress and assembly workers can 
be reliably and cost-effectively secured at home. 
The Chinese firm can choose to pursue ordinary trade and sell directly to foreign consumers, or 
alternatively to engage in processing trade with a foreign party via pure assembly or processing with 
imports.5 The up-front expenses and hence liquidity needs of the Chinese firm are lowest under pure 
assembly, higher under processing with imports, and highest under ordinary trade. With PA, the Chinese 
firm pays only for domestic inputs and assembly. With PI, it is responsible for domestic inputs, foreign 
inputs, and assembly. With OT, it covers product design, domestic and foreign inputs, import duties on 
foreign inputs, assembly, and distribution abroad. The foreign trade partner bears the cost of any 
activities not performed by the Chinese firm. 
We hypothesize that the profits of the Chinese firm are lowest under pure assembly, higher under 
processing with imports, and highest under ordinary trade. With OT, it operates completely 
independently and captures all profits from foreign sales. With PT, on the other hand, trade partners 
presumably make relationship-specific investments in product design, input sourcing, assembly, and 
distribution. In the presence of incomplete contracting, this would generate a two-sided hold-up problem, 
such that profit sharing would be determined by ex-post Nash bargaining. The return to the Chinese firm 
would then be its outside option (i.e. revenues from selling the assembled product to another buyer) plus 
its share of the surplus rents from the partnership. Since bargaining power stems from parties’ relative 
importance to the relationship, each side’s bargaining weight would likely increase with its contribution 
to total costs. The Chinese firm’s profits would thus rise from PA to PI to OT. 
The ranking of trade regimes by up-front costs and ex-post profits might be reinforced by three 
additional factors. To the extent that other forces might make this ranking ambiguous, which 
mechanisms dominate would ultimately be an empirical question and we would be less likely to find 
support for our hypotheses in the data. 
5 This assumes that there is sufficient demand abroad both for final goods supplied by ordinary Chinese exporters and 
for outsourcing production to China via processing trade. We believe this approximates well the economic environment 
in China, and it allows us to concentrate on the trade-offs faced by the Chinese entrepreneur. See also Section 6.6. 
3.1   Key intuitions 
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First, given product demand, there is a profit-maximizing level of output for each export mode. 
While operating at a lower, second-best scale would reduce input costs and financing requirements, it 
would also decrease profits. If a firm has more liquidity than necessary for first-best production levels 
in one trade regime (e.g. PI) but less than required for first-best production levels in a higher-ranked 
regime (e.g. OT), it could choose to operate at a second-best scale under the higher-ranked regime. By 
revealed preference, however, this would still imply greater profits with the higher-ranked regime. 
Second, ordinary firms can opt to use fewer imported inputs than processing firms if foreign 
parts are more expensive than domestic parts, especially if the import tariff is high; processing firms 
have little flexibility or interest in doing so because they must observe the specifications of the foreign 
buyer and because they don’t incur import duties. From the perspective of the Chinese firm, this is 
unlikely to reduce OT costs below PI costs given the typically large costs of product design and foreign 
distribution. Moreover, deviating from the first-best input mix would lower profits, for example because 
domestic parts are of worse quality and poor substitutes for foreign parts. By the same revealed-
preference argument as above, an OT firm would therefore substitute towards local inputs only if this 
still guarantees higher profits than alternative trade regimes. 
Finally, imperfect contractibility might generate moral hazard in production because of a 
standard agency problem from the theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990): 
Trade partners would underinvest if they incur the full cost of an input but receive only a share of its 
marginal revenue. For example, the Chinese producer might have to exert effort in sourcing well-priced 
inputs and labor, whose quantity and quality suit the manufacturing process. He might also expend effort 
in managing plant operations and monitoring assembly. The higher his bargaining weight, the more 
effort he would be incentivized to invest and the higher sales would presumably be.6 This could magnify 
the difference in profitability across trade modes. 
Given the above ranking of profits across export regimes, ordinary trade would be the dominant 
strategy for Chinese firms with the financial liquidity necessary to cover the associated up-front 
expenditures. However, some companies might have restricted access to internal and external capital. 
The former would arise if they cannot retain sufficient earnings from operations, for example because 
they must transfer profits to stockholders due to principal-agent issues inside the firm. The latter would 
occur in the presence of credit market frictions, such as limited contract enforcement (e.g. endogenous 
default; weak protection of financiers’ collateral claims) or asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers (e.g. adverse selection; unobserved cost or demand shocks). 
6 This assumes that the foreign party doesn’t underinvest or its underinvestment is less harmful to production. This 
would be more likely when it resides in a country with stronger contract enforcement. 
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Faced with a binding credit constraint, Chinese firms would pursue the most profitable trade 
regime they can with their available financial capital. Manufacturers would sort into different regimes 
based on their financial health, holding all other firm characteristics constant: Most financially 
constrained exporters would conduct pure assembly and earn low profits. Less financially constrained 
exporters would conduct import-and-assembly and earn higher profits. Least financially constrained 
exporters would conduct ordinary trade and earn the highest profits. 
3.2    Empirical hypotheses 
Section 3.1 builds intuition by focusing on single-product firms exporting to a single destination. We 
next consider the effects of credit constraints in a world with multi-product firms selling to multiple 
destinations. This accounts for the richer choice set available to manufacturers in reality and sheds more 
light on the underlying mechanisms of interest. It also allows us to develop empirically testable 
hypotheses and appropriate identification strategies. 
Firms actively choose how many products to make, which products to make, and under what 
trade regime so as to maximize total profits. They must allocate their financial resources across product 
lines and export modes, recognizing that different products feature different up-front liquidity needs and 
ex-post payoffs because of different cost and revenue structures. This allocation entails two related 
liquidity-profit trade-offs:  First, manufacturing more products might increase total revenues but impose 
higher ex-ante costs. Second, processing trade (especially pure assembly) uses up less liquidity per 
product than ordinary trade, and can thereby enable a firm to spread its funds across more products. This 
tends to increase total profits along the extensive margin. However, PT (especially PA) offers lower 
returns per product than OT. This tends to decrease total profits along the intensive margin. 
While this optimization problem is complex, its solution is intuitive. Ordering products by their 
revenue-to-liquidity-needs ratio, firms will optimally add products in decreasing order of attractiveness 
and adjust export modes along the way, until they exhaust their available liquidity. In other words, both 
the level of up-front costs and the ratio of payoffs to up-front costs matter. A multi-product manufacturer 
would choose ordinary trade for products with relatively low up-front costs and high revenue potential; 
opt for processing with imports for goods with intermediate cost and revenue levels; and select pure 
assembly for articles with high liquidity requirements but limited returns. The logic is that firms should 
direct more funds towards trade regimes guaranteeing a bigger share of revenues only if these revenues 
are sufficiently high relative to the higher liquidity needs of such regimes. 
We expect exporters with more access to finance to differ from capital-scarce firms in a number 
of respects. First, the cut-off levels of liquidity needs (cut-off ratios of revenue-to-liquidity-needs) that 
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induce firms to adopt different trade regimes for different products would be higher (lower) for 
financially healthier manufacturers, because they can allocate more liquidity to each product line. For 
any given product, less constrained firms would thus be more likely to pursue ordinary trade relative to 
processing trade and import-and-assembly relative to pure assembly. Second, financially healthier 
producers would move further down the pecking order of products and export more goods, including 
goods with higher liquidity needs that create stronger incentives for processing trade and pure assembly. 
Aggregating across products to the firm level, the relationship between firms’ financial health and the 
share of each regime in total exports is therefore theoretically ambiguous. Finally, firms with more 
access to financing would earn higher profits because they can always undertake (weakly) more 
profitable trade strategies than producers with less access to financing. 
In our data, we will observe firm exports at two levels of disaggregation: by product category 
and by sector. We will also use sector-level measures of financial dependence, i.e. the need for external 
capital in financing operations. Since multiple product categories map into the same sector and these 
product categories may have different up-front costs and revenue-to-liquidity-needs ratios, a firm might 
export under multiple trade regimes within a sector even if it chooses a unique trade regime for each 
product category. Furthermore, the product categories we study are finely disaggregated, but may 
nevertheless group products with varying cost and revenue structures. As a result, a firm might use 
multiple export modes within a product category even if it adopts a single mode for each product. 
These arguments imply systematic and smooth variation in profitability and export strategies 
across firms and sectors. We summarize these predictions with the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1      Across firms within a sector, profits fall with the share of processing exports in total 
exports � 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
� and with the share of pure assembly in processing exports � 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
�. 
Hypothesis 2      Across firms within a sector, the share of processing exports in total exports 
�
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
� and the share of pure assembly in processing exports � 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
� increase with firms’ 
financial health. 
Hypothesis 3      Across sectors within a firm, the share of processing exports in total exports 
�
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
� and the share of pure assembly in processing exports � 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
� increase with sectors' 
financial dependence. 
Note that Hypotheses 2 and 3 hold not only for the variation in firms’ worldwide exports, but 
also for the variation in firms’ exports to individual destination markets. This recognizes that cross-
country differences in product demand, customization costs or distribution costs might incentivize an 
exporter to serve different markets via different trade modes, even if selling the same product. 
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4    Data 
4.1    Trade and balance-sheet data 
Our analysis makes use of two proprietary datasets on the activities of Chinese firms in 2005. Firms are 
legally required to complete both, and compliance is strictly enforced by different government agencies. 
The first one is the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics.7 It provides standard balance-sheet data for all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and all private 
companies with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan8. We observe each firms’ location in one of 31 
provinces and its main industry of activity out of 475 finely disaggregated categories in the Chinese 
GBT 4-digit classification. The main variables of interest to us are measures of firm profitability and 
financial status, which we discuss in greater detail below. We also use information on total sales, 
employment, capital and material inputs to construct proxies for firm size and productivity. 
We also utilize the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) collected by the Chinese Customs 
Office, which contains detailed information about the universe of trade transactions.9 It reports the value 
of firm exports (free on board) and imports (cost, insurance and freight included) in U.S. dollars by 
country and product for 243 destination/source countries and 7,526 products in the 8-digit Harmonized 
System.10 The records indicate whether each cross-border sale occurs under ordinary trade, processing 
with imports or pure assembly. The trade-regime classification thus characterizes individual transactions 
rather than firms. This allows us to construct continuous measures of the proclivity for using different 
trade regimes at the firm level. Since we are interested in manufacturers’ export decisions, we drop 
export-import companies that serve exclusively as intermediaries between domestic producers (buyers) 
and foreign buyers (suppliers).11 
Our empirical analysis critically relies on combining data from both sources. While each is 
organized around company registration numbers, the authorities have not released a unique firm 
identifier. We therefore merge the census files to the customs records based on an algorithm that matches 
firms' names and contact information, including addresses and phone numbers.12 While imperfect, this 
7 As in Wang and Yu (2012), the ASIF data are cleaned by excluding observations according to the following criteria: 
(a) firms in non-manufacturing industries (2-digit GB/T industry code >43 or <13) and tobacco (GB/T code 16); (b) 
observations with negative values for output, sales, exports, capital, or intermediate inputs; (c) observations with total 
assets less than total fixed assets or total liquid assets, or with total sales less than exports. 
8 This is equivalent to 0.6 million USD based on the USD-CNY exchange rate in 2005. 
9 Manova and Zhang (2009) describe the data and stylized facts about firm heterogeneity in Chinese trade. 
10 Product classification is consistent across countries at the 6-digit HS level. The number of distinct product codes in 
the Chinese 8-digit HS classification is comparable to that in the 10-digit HS trade data for the U.S. 
11 Since the data do not directly flag trade intermediaries, we follow standard practice and use keywords in firm names 
to identify them (Ahn et al. 2011). We drop 29,982 wholesalers that mediate 22.3% of China’s trade. 
12 See Wang and Yu (2012) for a detailed description of the matching procedure. 
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procedure generates a large and representative sample. We are able to obtain balance-sheet data for 44% 
of all exporters in CCTS and trade transactions for 67% of all firms reporting positive exports in ASIF. 
We have verified that matched exporters exhibit similar trade patterns as the full sample of exporters in 
the customs registry. Likewise, the balance sheets of the matched exporters are comparable to those of 
all exporters in the census. 
4.2    Summary statistics 
Table 1 illustrates the substantial variation in size and performance across the 50,606 Chinese firms in 
our matched sample. Mean log sales and log exports amount to 10.64 and 13.83, with standard deviations 
of 1.35 and 2.08 respectively. Log profits and log value added average 7.33 and 9.23, with corresponding 
standard deviations of 1.95 and 1.48. The dispersion in profitability, measured by the ratio of profits to 
sales, is greater with a mean of 0.03 and standard deviation of 0.20. 
The Venn diagram in Figure 1 shows the distribution of firms operating in a single vs. multiple 
trade regime. It shows the percentage share of exporters engaged in each of 7 possible combinations of 
trade modes (PA; PI; OT; PA and PI; PA and OT; PI and OT; PA, PI and OT). The reported percentages 
sum to 100%. 63.0% of all sellers ship only ordinary exports, while 2.7% and 11.0% conduct exclusively 
pure assembly and processing with imports, respectively. The remaining 23.3% pursue mixed trade 
strategies, with 3.5% undertaking some activity under all three regimes. Similar patterns obtain when 
we look at a finer level of disaggregation and consider firm-sector pairs instead of firms (not shown). 
Figure 2 replicates Figure 1, but instead of the percentage share of firms in a segment, it reports the 
percentage share of aggregate exports captured by firms in that segment. Processing trade, especially PI, 
contributes substantially more to the value of Chinese exports than its number of firms would suggest. 
This is despite the low value added associated with processing trade and reflects its high import content. 
Table 2 documents the variation in the composition of firms’ exports in terms of trade regimes. 
We analyze two indicators: the share of processing exports (both pure assembly and import-and-
assembly) in total exports, (PA+PI)/(PA+PI+OT), and the share of pure assembly in total processing 
exports, PA/(PA+PI). We construct each measure at different levels of aggregation in order to study the 
variation along different dimensions of trade activity. Table 2 reports summary statistics for all firms in 
the CCTS data, but similar patterns obtain in the matched ASIF-CCTS sample. 
The average firm conducts 27% of its exports via processing trade and 24% of its processing 
exports via pure assembly. However, there is considerable variation in activity across firms – standard 
deviations are 41% and 41%. We observe comparable means and standard deviations when we compute 
the two trade shares separately for each firm-ISIC sector pair, each firm-ISIC-destination triplet, each 
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firm-HS product pair, or each firm-HS-destination triplet. On the other hand, we see less variation in 
trade regime choices across sectors or products within firms; even less across sectors or products within 
firm-destination pairs; and the least across destination markets within firm-product or firm-sector pairs. 
This can be inferred by comparing respective standard deviations and means. For example, the standard 
deviation of (PA+PI)/(PA+PI+OT) across destinations within firm-ISIC pairs is 5% relative to a mean 
of 18%, while its overall standard deviation across firms is 41% relative to a mean of 27%. 
Manufacturers’ use of foreign inputs is consistent with their choice of export mode. For instance, 
ordinary exporters are less prone to import parts from abroad, while companies exporting under more 
than one trade regime import intermediates under multiple regimes as well. Accounting for province, 
industry and firm ownership fixed effects, the conditional correlation between the share of processing 
exports in total exports and the share of processing imports in total imports is 0.603 across firms and 
significant at 0.1%. Likewise, the conditional correlation between the share of pure-assembly exports in 
total processing exports and the share of pure-assembly imports in total processing imports is 0.946 
across firms and significant at 0.1%. 
4.3    Measuring financial constraints 
We employ four different proxies for sectors’ financial vulnerability, which have been commonly used 
in the literature on the role of credit constraints for trade and growth. These variables are meant to 
identify technologically-determined characteristics of each sector that are inherent to the nature of the 
manufacturing process and beyond the control of individual firms. They are available from Kroszner et 
al. (2007) for 29 ISIC 3-digit sectors, which we match to the Chinese HS 8-digit products.13 
There are systematic differences across sectors in firms’ reliance on external capital for funding 
operations. These arise because of variation in the relative importance of up-front costs and the lag 
between the time when production expenses are incurred and the time when revenues are realized. We 
use the ratio of inventories to sales (Inventi) to proxy the duration of the manufacturing process and the 
working capital firms require in order to maintain inventories and meet demand. This measure indexes 
producers’ liquidity needs in the short run, which are associated mainly with variable costs such as the 
cost of labor and intermediate inputs. We exploit two indicators of firms’ funding needs for long-term 
investments that comprise mostly fixed costs. The classic measure is sectors’ external finance 
dependence (ExtFini), obtained as the share of capital expenditures not financed with internal cash flows. 
13 The measures are constructed following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven 
(2003). They are averaged over the 1980-1999 period for the median U.S. firm in each sector.  
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We also study the share of R&D spending in total sales (RDi), since research and development typically 
occur at the beginning of a production cycle before manufacturing and marketing can commence. 
Sectors vary not only in firms’ reliance on external finance, but also in firms' ability to raise 
external finance. We proxy the latter with the endowment of hard assets that companies can pledge as 
collateral when accessing capital markets. This is gauged by asset tangibility (Tangi), defined as the 
share of net plant, property and equipment in total book-value assets. 
As standard in the literature, these sector measures are constructed from data on all publicly 
traded U.S.-based companies from Compustat’s annual industrial files. This approach is motivated by a 
number of considerations. First, the United States have one of the most advanced and sophisticated 
financial systems, which makes it reasonable that the behavior of U.S. companies reflects firms’ optimal 
asset structure and use of external capital. Second, having the U.S. as the reference country eliminates 
the concern that sectors’ financial vulnerability might endogenously respond to China's level of financial 
development. In fact, if the most financially vulnerable industries in the U.S. employ more internal 
financing and tangible assets in China because of the worse financial system there, our results would be 
biased downwards. Finally, what is required for identification is not that industries have the same 
tangibility and liquidity needs in the U.S. and China, but rather that the ranking of sectors remain 
relatively stable across countries. To the extent that it doesn’t, measurement error would once again bias 
our estimates down. Kroszner et al. (2007), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003), 
among others, argue that the measures of financial vulnerability capture a large technological component 
that is innate to a sector and therefore a good proxy for ranking industries in all countries. Consistent 
with this argument, the measures vary substantially more across industries than across firms within an 
industry, and the hierarchy of sectors is quite stable over time. 
In addition to these sector indicators, we also construct two standard balance-sheet measures of 
firms' financial health.14 Liquidity gives the difference between current assets and current liabilities, 
scaled by total assets. It signals firms' availability of liquid capital. Leverage is the ratio of current 
liabilities to current assets.15 Firms with higher leverage have more financial obligations outstanding in 
the short run and less freedom in managing cash flows or raising additional external capital. We thus 
expect exporters with high liquidity and low leverage to be financially healthier and less constrained. 
A first glimpse at the variation in trade activity with firms' financial health and sectors' financial 
vulnerability reveals patterns consistent with our hypotheses (Figure 3). We divide firms into two 
14 See for example Whited (1992), Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Greenaway et al. (2007), and Ding et al. (2013). 
15 Leverage is often defined as short-term debt / current assets. In standard Chinese accounting practices, short-term 
debt and current liability correspond to the same variable on firms’ balance sheets, “Liu Dong Fu Zhai”.  
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subsamples with liquidity above and below the median.16 While the average share of processing trade 
in total exports is 29.4% for high-liquidity firms, it is 31.2% for low-liquidity firms. The corresponding 
numbers are 17.7% and 19.4% for the share of pure assembly in processing exports. When we distinguish 
between sectors with working capital needs above and below the median, we observe substantially 
bigger differences. In industries with high inventory-to-sales ratios, the typical firm conducts 19.9% of 
its exports via processing trade and 22.7% of its processing exports via pure assembly. By contrast, these 
shares drop to 14.3% and 14.6% for industries with low inventory-to-sales ratio. 
5    Firm Profitability and Attributes across Trade Regimes 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In this section, we first examine the variation in 
profitability and other firm attributes across Chinese exporters engaged in different trade regimes. In 
Section 6, we then analyze the effect of financial frictions on companies’ choice of trade regimes. 
According to Hypothesis 1, firm profitability should increase as the composition of foreign sales 
shifts from pure assembly to processing with imports to ordinary trade. To assess the empirical validity 
of this prediction, we construct the share of processing exports in total exports � 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
� and the 
share of pure assembly in processing exports � 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
� for firm f, after summing f’s exports across all 
of its destinations and products. For each 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓, we estimate the following specification in the 
matched ASIF-CCTS sample of exporters with balance-sheet data, where 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 represents 
either f’s log total profits or profit-to-sales ratio: 
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓              (1) 
Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 report raw correlations between 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 
that may be subject to omitted variable bias. Columns 2 and 6 account for any systematic differences 
across industries and production locations in China using ASIF information on firms’ province and main 
industry of activity in the Chinese GBT 4-digit classification. We include 31 province 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 and 475 
industry 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 fixed effects in order to capture the role of factor costs, factor intensities, transportation 
costs, financial market development, institutional frictions, tax treatment, etc. that could both favor 
certain export modes and directly impact profitability. In Columns 3 and 7 we further control for firm 
size with log employment, as well as for firms’ ownership status since foreign corporations might have 
16 We control for systematic differences in liquidity across firms with different ownership structures by defining these 
medians separately for private domestic firms, state-owned enterprises, joint ventures and foreign affiliates. 
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distinct incentives and characteristics from local companies. In particular, we use dummies for state-
owned enterprises, joint ventures, and wholly-owned multinational affiliates, the excluded category 
being private domestic firms. We employ Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓. 
The coefficient of interest 𝛽𝛽 reflects the sign of the conditional correlation between firms’ 
profitability and choice of trade regime. This coefficient is identified from the variation across exporters 
within narrowly defined segments of the economy. We emphasize that we cannot and do not want to 
give 𝛽𝛽 a causal interpretation: As discussed in Section 3, profits and export activity are joint outcomes 
of firms' maximization problem and are thus both affected by producers’ financial health. Other firm 
attributes unrelated to credit constraints might also influence both variables. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that manufacturers’ profits and profitability indeed vary 
systematically with their trade strategy: they both decrease with the share of processing exports in total 
foreign sales and with the share of pure assembly in processing exports. These patterns are independent 
of the fact that bigger firms tend to be more profitable (the unreported coefficient on employment is 
positive). They are also economically significant. A one-standard-deviation rise in 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
 is 
associated with a 0.66% higher profit-to-sales ratio, while processing exporters with a one-standard-
deviation higher value of 𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
 enjoy 0.95% higher profitability. The profit levels of two companies 
whose trade shares are one standard deviation apart differ by 6.2% and 11.4%, respectively. 
As standard with balance-sheet data, Chinese firms report consolidated profits from both 
domestic and foreign sales. To the extent that trade-regime choices affect revenues abroad but not 
operations at home, the findings above may underestimate the importance of trade modes for export 
profitability. In Columns 4 and 8, we repeat the analysis for the subset of firms that sell exclusively 
abroad but not domestically. While "pure exporters" represent only about 20% of our matched sample, 
we can be sure that their profits capture solely cross-border activities. As anticipated, we obtain bigger 
point estimates in this group of producers. 
The remainder of Table 3 illustrates other differences among companies with varying export 
strategies by comparing their productivity, input and output choices. Each cell reports the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 
from estimating specification (1) for a different firm characteristic as the outcome variable.17 Focusing 
on the conditional correlations in Columns 3 and 7, a few patterns stand out. First, firms that undertake 
more processing trade have lower total sales, lower value added and lower domestic sales in China, but 
17 Domestic sales are calculated as the difference between total sales and total exports. TFP is constructed as in 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), by 2-digit industry and ownership type (foreign vs. domestic) using the complete ASIF 
panel for 2001-2006. Skill, capital and material intensity are measured respectively with the log average wage, the ratio 
of net fixed assets to the wage bill, and the ratio of material purchases to the wage bill. 
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higher export revenues. Among processing exporters, those that pursue more pure assembly tend to sell 
less overall because they export less, as well as to add less value in production. Second, more productive 
firms are less likely to conduct processing trade and especially pure assembly, where we measure 
productivity with TFP or value added per worker. Third, capital and material intensity are positively 
correlated with (XPA + XPI) / (XPA + XPI + XOT) and negatively correlated with XPA / (XPA + XPI), while 
average wage per worker is not significantly related to (XPA + XPI) / (XPA + XPI + XOT) and negatively 
associated with XPA / (XPA + XPI). Finally, exporters that carry on more processing trade and especially 
pure assembly have higher imports and source a bigger share of imported inputs under processing trade. 
These patterns hold often but not always in the raw correlations in Columns 1 and 5. 
These findings suggest that multiple firm characteristics might determine or be correlated with 
the choice of trade regimes. Our analysis below ensures that the estimated effects of financial frictions 
do not capture the role of other factors such as company size, productivity, capital and skill intensity. 
6    Financial Frictions and Firms’ Choice of Trade Regimes 
Having established that profitability differs across trade regimes, we next show that credit constraints 
prevent entrepreneurs from pursuing more profitable regimes. We perform a series of complementary 
tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 in order to establish causality and examine the channels through which 
financial frictions operate. In particular, we explore the variation in financial health across firms and 
within firms over time; the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors within firms; and the 
variation in financial market development across space. 
6.1    Firms’ financial health: cross-section 
We first study the relationship between firms’ financial health and export activity in the cross section 
with the following specification: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓              (2) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 refers to one of the two trade regime shares. We proxy 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 interchangeably 
with f's liquidity or leverage ratio lagged by one year, where firms with more liquid assets and fewer 
debt obligations are deemed less constrained. We lag the financial health measures to alleviate concerns 
with reverse causality since concurrent indicators are more likely to respond to trade activity; using 
concurrent liquidity and leverage delivers qualitatively similar results of slightly greater magnitudes. 
We allow for any dispersion in supply and demand conditions across Chinese regions and 
economic sectors with province 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 and industry 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 fixed effects based on the location and primary GBT-
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4 industry affiliation of each firm. We further control for systematic differences among producers of 
different organizational structures with ownership dummies. This extensive set of fixed effects accounts 
for many independent factors determining the choice of trade regime, such as space-based industrial 
policies (e.g. special economic zones, Defever and Riaño 2012) and the optimal organization of 
production across firm boundaries (e.g. domestic vs. foreign ownership, Feenstra and Hanson 2005 and 
Fernandes and Tang 2012). In robustness checks, we consider the role of other firm characteristics 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 as 
discussed below. We report robust standard errors 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓. 
The results in Table 4 indicate a strong association between companies’ financial status and 
choice of export regime. Manufacturers with lower liquidity and higher leverage conduct more 
processing trade (Column 1). Conditional on engaging in processing trade, they also engage in more 
pure assembly relative to import-and-assembly (Column 2). These findings are highly statistically 
significant and economically meaningful. Improving liquidity or leverage by one standard deviation 
would reduce the share of processing exports in total exports by 1-1.5% and the share of pure assembly 
in processing exports by up to 1%. 
In unreported regressions, we have confirmed that companies’ financial health is related to their 
use of foreign inputs in a manner consistent with their choice of export regime: Credit-constrained firms 
are more likely not only to export, but also to import under processing trade, especially pure assembly. 
We perform back-of-the-envelope calculations to gauge the potential aggregate gains from 
strengthening capital markets that could arise specifically via the reallocation of export activity across 
trade regimes; this abstracts from gains operating through other channels. We consider a counterfactual 
scenario in which all Chinese firms were to be endowed with the liquidity of the least constrained 
company. Combining the coefficient estimates in Tables 3 and 4, we calculate that aggregate Chinese 
profits and value added would rise by 5.2 billion RMB and 15 billion RMB, respectively, which 
translates into growth rates of 0.5% and 0.3%.18 We caution that this quantification is based on reduced-
form results that might be subject to endogeneity concerns (see below) and that might not accurately 
capture the general equilibrium effects of financial development. Since it reflects only adjustments 
across trade regimes within exporters, this counterfactual also ignores the potential gains from export 
entry by previously constrained non-exporters. Enhancing capital access to levels enjoyed by financially 
more advanced nations than China would likewise imply higher gains than in our benchmark. 
18 Estimates based on results controlling for firm size and productivity as discussed below. The estimated gains in profits 
and value added amount to 2.3 billion RMB and 6.6 billion RMB in our matched sample of firms with customs and 
census data. Since this sample appears representative and covers 44% of all companies in the customs registry, 2.3/0.44 
= 5.2bil RMB and 6.6/0.44 = 15bil RMB approximate the economy-wide gains. 
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A number of factors other than credit constraints could affect firms’ choice of trade regime and 
bias our estimates. We next show that our baseline results survive a series of robustness checks that 
alleviate such concerns and help us rule out alternative explanations. 
Firm size and productivity 
One potential concern with our baseline estimation is omitted variable bias arising from the relationship 
among financial health, trade activity, and other firm characteristics. The key issue is whether these other 
firm characteristics impact companies’ trade regime directly through non-finance channels, indirectly 
by determining access to finance which in turn affects trade outcomes, or both. 
Consider first firm productivity. Evidence in Brandt and Morrow (2015), Dai et al. (2011), and 
Defever and Riaño (2012) indicates that Chinese firms conducting processing trade are less productive 
than ordinary exporters. On the one hand, productivity may be a primitive attribute that uniquely pins 
down all relevant firm outcomes, including access to capital, choice of inputs and production technology, 
total size, and export mode. For example, if financiers observe firm productivity, they would extend 
more credit to more productive firms with higher expected profits. In the presence of endogenous default 
due to imperfect contract enforceability, this would generate credit underprovision and some less 
productive firms would be credit rationed or credit constrained. Regressing firms’ trade regime choice 
on firms’ financial health alone would then correctly capture the effect of access to capital. Controlling 
for productivity in this regression would leave no additional explanatory power for financial health, 
consistent with productivity shaping trade outcomes (at least in part) through the credit channel. 
Similarly, conditioning on other firm characteristics such as size that are joint outcomes of the firm’s 
maximization problem would bring 𝛽𝛽 down to zero but not invalidate the finance channel. 
Of note, whether productivity perfectly predicts firms’ financial health depends on the nature of 
capital market imperfections. For instance, asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers 
would cause both credit misallocation and credit underprovision, such that a more productive firm would 
not necessarily receive more funding than a less productive firm. Such misallocation could arise if there 
are firm-specific shocks that are not observed by financiers or if access to capital depends on political 
connections. In this case, controlling for productivity in specification (2) would reduce 𝛽𝛽 without forcing 
it to zero, and 𝛽𝛽 would underestimate the effect of financial frictions on trade regime choices. 
On the other hand, productivity may directly affect export activity through non-finance channels. 
In the spirit of Melitz (2003), if more productive firms earn higher revenues and trade regimes differ in 
profitability and fixed costs, then more productive manufacturers would self-select into the more 
profitable trade regimes with higher fixed costs (as in the theoretical models of Brandt and Morrow 2015 
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and Defever and Riaño 2012). In practice, product design, marketing and distribution likely do impose 
fixed costs on ordinary exporters which processing exporters avoid. If financial health is correlated with 
productivity, omitting the latter from the regression could bias our estimates of 𝛽𝛽. 
Firm size could similarly impact both access to financing and trade participation. Evidence in 
the finance literature suggests that bigger firms are less credit constrained ceteris paribus (e.g. Beck et 
al. 2008, Guiso et al. 2004). If fixed costs vary across trade regimes, bigger companies might be more 
likely to pursue ordinary trade both because they dispose of more liquidity and because they can more 
easily amortize higher fixed costs. While the former would be consistent with the credit mechanism that 
we emphasize, the latter could imply that our results are spurious. A further complication is that if 
productivity influences access to capital, productivity and financial health might jointly determine firms’ 
size and trade activity. Conditioning on size in specification (2) would then again be over-controlling. 
In sum, firm size and productivity are not classic omitted variables in our context. Including 
them as controls 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 in equation (2) could inform the microfoundations of firms’ credit constraints, but 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽 might then underestimate the effect of financial health. Conversely, excluding them could 
lead to biased estimates. In order to remain conservative, in Columns 3-4 of Table 4 we explicitly control 
for companies' lagged total factor productivity and lagged log employment.19 The coefficient on 
financial health retains its statistical significance. Its magnitude is approximately halved in the case of 
(XPA + XPI) / (XPA + XPI + XOT) and less affected in the case of XPA / (XPA + XPI). This suggests that firm 
size and productivity are imperfectly correlated with access to capital, in line with priors about inefficient 
financial markets in China. Moreover, comparative statics indicate that the role of financial health is an 
order of magnitude greater than that of the other two firm characteristics. For example, one standard 
deviation rises in leverage, TFP and size are associated with a change of 0.3%, 0.02% and 0.08% in (XPA 
+ XPI) / (XPA + XPI + XOT) and a change of 0.9%, 0.02% and 0.01% in XPA / (XPA + XPI). To guard against 
omitted variable bias, we always condition on firm size and productivity in the rest of the analysis. 
Production technology 
We address concerns with other omitted variables related to firms’ production technology in Columns 
5-6 of Table 4. In particular, we control for exporters’ log age, lagged capital intensity (ratio of net fixed 
assets to total wage bill), lagged skill intensity (log average wage), and lagged material intensity (ratio 
of material inputs to total wage bill).20 To the extent that these characteristics constitute endogenous 
19 Similar results obtain if we use value added per worker instead of TFP or log sales instead of log employment. 
20 Krishna et al. (2015) analyze how Chinese firms learn from exporting on the cost and demand side depending on 
whether they export directly or indirectly through trade intermediaries. To the extent that learning from exporting might 
21 
firm choices over inputs and production technology, they might be determined jointly with trade 
outcomes by financial health and/or productivity. If so, including them in 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 would produce lower-bound 
estimates for 𝛽𝛽. On the other hand, if financial health is correlated with these firm characteristics but 
they affect trade outcomes through non-finance channels, omitting them could bias 𝛽𝛽. Reassuringly, this 
robustness check leaves our results qualitatively unchanged. To remain conservative, henceforth we 
always include the full set of firm-level controls as in Column 5-6. 
Bilateral trade shares 
The set of export destinations varies significantly across firms in our sample. Since countries differ in 
trade costs, demand conditions, and the broader economic environment, different trade regimes might 
be best suited to serving different markets for reasons unrelated to financial frictions. To rule out the 
possibility that our results are driven by compositional effects, we construct exporters’ trade shares by 
destination d and estimate a modified version of equation (2) that adds country fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑                 (2`) 
We employ the full set of firm controls 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 discussed above and cluster errors by firm to account for the 
potential correlation in 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 across markets within producers. This stringent specification delivers 
qualitatively similar estimates of marginally greater magnitudes than our firm-level analysis (Columns 
7-8 in Table 4). We ensure that the market composition of firms’ exports does not affect our subsequent 
results by presenting evidence at both the firm and the firm-country level. 
Binary trade shares 
Given that many Chinese exporters operate under a single trade regime (c.f. Figure 1), the linearity 
assumptions implicit in ordinary least squares might generate misspecification bias. In our sample, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 fall strictly between 0 and 1 for a quarter to a third of the 
observations. This is consistent with our hypotheses, and moreover appears inconsequential 
econometrically: Our findings remain unchanged or become statistically and economically more 
significant when we replace the continuous trade shares with binary indicators set to 1 for all values 
above 0. Columns 9-10 in Table 4 present point estimates based on a linear probability model applied to 
disaggregated data at the firm-destination level, for which 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 = {0,1} holds more 
frequently than at the firm level. Similar patterns emerge for binary trade shares at the firm level. 
also vary across trade regimes, this is less relevant for our cross-sectional analysis, and is anyhow implicitly accounted 
for with the productivity and age controls. 
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Multiple products and sectors per firm 
Specifications (2) and (2`) explore the variation in trade outcomes and financial health across firms 
within 475 finely disaggregated GBT 4-digit industries, where each firm is assigned its primary industry 
of affiliation as reported in ASIF. This ignores the fact that many exporters are in fact active in multiple 
industries and products. We address this by exploiting the CCTS trade statistics on firm exports by ISIC 
3-digit sector (29 categories) and by HS 8-digit product (5,784 categories). Although the ISIC 
classification is less granular than GBT-4, we consider it for consistency with our subsequent analysis 
of ISIC sectors’ financial vulnerability. 
In Table 5, we estimate the following equations to more rigorously test Hypothesis 2: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖                     (3) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖               (3`) 
We compute the outcome variables separately for each firm-ISIC sector pair in Columns 1-2, each firm-
destination-ISIC sector triplet in Columns 3-4, and each firm-destination-HS product triplet (the most 
disaggregated level available) in Columns 5-6. We include the full set of firm characteristics 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓. We 
control for exogenous supply and demand conditions with corresponding ISIC-3 or HS-8 fixed effects 
𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 and province fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 in specification (3), and additionally with destination fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 
in specification (3`). While many firms pursue a mix of export regimes overall, they often choose a 
single one for a given industry, and even more frequently for a given industry-destination or product-
destination market. We therefore use binary indicators for 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖; 
continuous trade shares produce comparable estimates. We cluster standard errors by firm. 
Accounting for the fact that firms may be active in multiple product lines or even broader sectors, 
we find that companies’ lagged financial health strongly predicts their choice of trade regime. On 
average, firms with more access to capital are more likely to select regimes with higher liquidity needs 
for any given sector or product that they pursue. We have separately checked that the baseline results in 
Table 4 where we assign firms’ total trade flows to their primary industry of activity are robust to 
controlling for the log number of HS-8 products they export (available on request). Together, these 
patterns lend further support to Hypothesis 2 and inform the operations of multi-product firms. In 
particular, they speak to the effects of financial frictions on the intensive margin: the choice of trade 
regime for sectors exported; we consider the extensive margin of number of sectors further below. 
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Robustness 
We have conducted a series of additional robustness checks that leave our conclusions unaffected (see 
Online Appendix Tables 1 and 2). First, we have confirmed our results when proxying size with log 
sales instead of log employment and material intensity with the ratio of material purchases to total sales 
instead of to the total wage bill. Second, we recognize that import tariffs in upstream industries can affect 
firms’ choice between processing and ordinary trade since the former permits duty-free imports of inputs 
(Brandt and Morrow 2015). Specifications (2)-(3`) implicitly take this into account because the industry 
fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 subsume the average tariff across imported inputs at the output-industry level. In 
addition, China’s import tariffs were relatively low by 2005, the year of our cross-sectional sample: The 
mean and standard deviation across HS-8 products amounted to 9.7% and 6.6% respectively. 
Nevertheless, there might be variation in effective import tariff rates across exporters in the same output 
industry if they use inputs in different proportions. We have therefore verified our findings for (XPA + 
XPI) / (XPA + XPI + XOT) controlling for firm-specific import tariffs constructed as the weighted average 
tariff across all HS-8 products that a firm imports, using tariff data from WITS and lagged firm imports 
by product as weights as in Yu (2013). 
Finally, we have explored the role of firms’ ownership type. Evidence indicates that the affiliates 
of multinational companies are less credit constrained than domestic firms because the former can tap 
additional financial resources by accessing foreign capital markets directly or indirectly via internal 
capital markets. At the same time, multinational affiliates are not completely unconstrained and 
insensitive to host-country financial conditions.21 Ceteris paribus, financial frictions can thus affect the 
trade regime choice of both domestic and foreign-owned firms in China. Since we condition on 
ownership type, our estimates are identified from the variation among producers with the same 
organizational structure. Furthermore, split-sample and interaction analyses indicate that qualitatively 
similar patterns hold for domestic and foreign-owned firms. 
6.2    Endogeneity 
It is important to assess whether the strong relationship between firms’ financial health and choice of 
trade regime is causal. A priori, even if export levels might influence firms’ access to finance, it is less 
obvious how the composition of exports would. We nevertheless consider two potential endogeneity 
21 Foley and Manova (2015) review the literature on the effects of financial frictions on multinational activity. For the 
case of China, Manova et al. (2015) show that fully and partially foreign-owned firms export significantly more than 
private domestic firms in financially more vulnerable sectors, while Huang et al. (2007) conclude that more credit 
constrained Chinese firms are more likely to be acquired by foreign firms. 
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problems that could arise only if financial markets are efficient. Their relevance may thus be limited 
given the well-established inefficiency of Chinese capital markets. 
 First, with frictionless capital markets, manufacturers would be able to raise the external finance 
required for their optimal export strategy. Since liquidity needs decline from ordinary trade to processing 
with imports to pure assembly, so would the observed use of outside capital across firms with different 
trade modes. This would generate the results in Tables 4 and 5, but not because of credit constraints as 
we posit. Although using lagged values of financial health helps alleviate this concern, it is not a perfect 
solution to the extent that firms’ financial health and trade shares may both be slow-moving. However, 
this alternative explanation is unlikely because of the substantial variation in profitability across trade 
regimes. Were Chinese exporters financially unconstrained, they would have pursued ordinary trade 
ceteris paribus. That they do not is strong indication that limited access to capital distorts companies' 
choice of export mode and ultimately performance. 
The second possible concern with reverse causality is more subtle. Suppose once again that firms 
face no credit constraints and sort into different trade regimes for some exogenous reason. Assume 
further that profitability falls from OT to PI to PA, only not endogenously because of financial frictions 
as discussed in Section 3.1, but due to non-finance factors. If investors are more willing to fund more 
profitable ventures, exporters more active in trade regimes that happen to have higher returns would 
exhibit stronger financial health. This scenario could once again spuriously deliver the results in Tables 
4 and 5. Although this rationalization requires a very special alignment of exogenous forces and thus 
seems unlikely to hold, we do not want to discount it lightly. 
Of note, endogeneity could lead us not only to overestimate, but also to underestimate the true 
impact of financial frictions on exporters’ activity. If partnerships with foreign buyers under processing 
trade increase the credibility of constrained Chinese firms as borrowers, conducting PA or PI might 
improve their access to capital in the Chinese market for external finance, as well as to trade credit from 
input suppliers. We would then be less likely to find empirical support for our hypotheses. 
Aside from these economics-based endogeneity concerns, some of our results might be spurious 
because of how standard accounting practices affect measured financial health. Recall that liquidity and 
leverage are defined respectively as (current assets – current liabilities) / total assets and current 
liabilities / current assets.22 Since current assets include input inventories, any inventories of foreign 
22 Current assets (“Liu Dong Zi Chan”) include inventories, cash, accounts receivable, investments, and pre-paid 
expenses, where inventories comprise finished products in the process of being sold and materials and inputs intended 
for future production. Note that the latter differs from the value of inputs used in production. Current liabilities (“Liu 
Dong Fu Zhai”) include short-term loans, accounts payable, and accrued liabilities, where accounts payable may include 
input purchases that have not yet been settled. Total assets (“Zong Zichan”) are the sum of fixed and current assets. 
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inputs provided by foreign buyers do not enter the financial ratios of Chinese firms under pure assembly, 
whereas inventories of foreign inputs acquired by Chinese firms under ordinary trade and processing 
with imports do.  It is not ex ante obvious whether and how this might affect the measured liquidity of 
firms with different export strategies: Foreign-input inventories enter both the numerator and the 
denominator, and some of their cost might be netted out of the numerator if it is still outstanding, since 
accounts payable are part of current liabilities. We also have no priors as to how the amount of foreign 
input inventories might vary across trade regimes, even if foreign input purchases do. As for leverage, 
it might be measured mechanically higher for firms conducting more PA relative to PI and OT, given 
that foreign input inventories enter only the denominator. If some of their cost is still outstanding and 
therefore part of accounts payable in the numerator, however, this concern would be mitigated.  
To establish the causal effect of credit constraints on firms’ choice of trade regime, in the rest of 
the paper we complement the evidence based on the cross-firm variation in financial health with results 
that exploit other sources of variation in the data for identification purposes. 
6.3    Firms’ financial health: dynamics 
We next provide time-series evidence for the relationship between firms’ financial health and export 
activity that is consistent with the cross-sectional patterns documented above. We separately evaluate 
the experience of continuing exporters and of first-time export entrants in the available panel data for 
2002-2006.23 We make this distinction to assess if the evolution of producers’ financial status 
differentially affects their trade regime choice upon export entry and subsequently. 
Changes within firms over time 
We explore whether changes in financial health lead continuing exporters to reorient operations across 
trade regimes by including firm fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 in a panel version of equations (2`) and (3`): 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓,𝑓𝑓−1 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓,𝑓𝑓−1 + 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓               (4) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓,𝑓𝑓−1 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓,𝑓𝑓−1 + 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓      (4`) 
The unit of observation in these regressions is either the firm-destination-year or firm-ISIC industry-
destination-year. The 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓’s subsume the role of firms’ ownership type, province, and primary industry 
affiliation, and control for time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics such as entrepreneurial ability 
and experience or existing bank relationships that permanently improve access to credit. Coefficient 𝛽𝛽 
23 Customs data are available 2000-2006, but the census panel begins in 2001 and we use 1-year lagged 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 . 
We have verified that our baseline cross-sectional results hold in the pooled panel with year fixed effects. 
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is thus identified purely from adjustments across trade modes within firms over time. We allow for 
common cost and demand shocks across manufacturers with destination 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑, ISIC industry 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖, and year 
𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 fixed effects. We also condition on the full set of time-variant firm controls 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 introduced above, 
and cluster standard errors by firm.24 We report results using binary indicators as the outcome variable, 
but qualitatively similar patterns hold with continuous measures. 
Of note, we have less identification power in the panel than in the cross-section: While the 
averages (standard deviations) of liquidity and leverage are 0.09 (0.32) and 0.99 (1.28) in the cross-
section for 2005, they are 0.08 (0.13) and 1.04 (0.34) within the average firm over the 2002-2006 period. 
At the same time, there is significant turnover, with many firms entering and exiting different markets 
and frequent changes in the trade-regime composition of exports within surviving firm-destinations over 
time. For instance, about 7.2% of firm-destinations with 100% processing exports in 2002 have switched 
to 100% ordinary exports by 2006, and another 21.8% have adopted mixed export strategies. Of firm-
destinations with mixed trade regimes in 2002, 25.4% switch to purely ordinary exports by 2006, and 
another 34.7% reduce their share of processing trade closer to 0. Of firm-destinations with 100% 
ordinary exports in 2002, only 13% initiate processing trade by 2006. A sizeable number of firm-
destinations thus gradually move from processing to ordinary exports, although the opposite trajectory 
also exists. Similar results hold for the composition of processing exports in terms of PA and PI. 
Table 6 indicates that improvements in financial health within firms over time are indeed 
followed by export activity shifting away from processing trade towards ordinary trade and away from 
pure assembly towards processing with imports (Columns 1-4). The point estimates for 𝛽𝛽 are however 
substantially smaller than in Tables 4 and 5. This suggests that continuing exporters do not modify their 
operations on an annual basis, possibly because of sunk adjustment costs and uncertainty about future 
demand and credit conditions. Combined with our earlier results, this implies that financial frictions are 
an important determinant of the cross-sectional variation in trade participation across firms, but play a 
lesser role in surviving exporters’ dynamics in the short run. The latter may be more responsive over a 
longer time horizon than our panel permits us to study. For example, firms that begin exporting via 
processing trade may be able to gradually accumulate sufficient financial resources through retained 
earnings and to transition into ordinary trade. 
24 Since we observe material intensity only in 2004, it is subsumed by the firm fixed effects in the panel regressions. 
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Export entry 
We next turn to first-time exporters, and study how financial health prior to entry affect companies’ 
choice of trade regime upon entry. We postulate that if a producer begins exporting in year t, it will be 
more likely to choose trade modes with lower liquidity requirements if it had access to less financial 
capital in year t-1. We test this hypothesis by re-estimating specifications (4) and (4`) in the subsample 
of firms exporting for the first time in year t.25  We once again report results using binary outcome 
variables, and note that similar patterns hold for continuous trade shares. As expected, we find that new 
exporters with less liquidity and more leverage conduct relatively more processing trade and more pure 
assembly in their first year of exporting (Columns 5-8). The magnitude of these effects is typically 2-3 
times bigger than that of financial health on trade activity in the cross-section: A one-standard-deviation 
improvement in liquidity (leverage) prior to export entry translate into 1.3% (2.1%) lower probability of 
processing trade and 1.2% (2.3%) lower probability of pure assembly conditional on conducting 
processing trade upon entry. By contrast, lagged productivity is frequently not a significant determinant 
of the trade-regime composition of export entrants (not reported). 
These findings reinforce our conclusion that the extensive margin of export entry is an important 
channel through which financial frictions impact firms’ trading strategy, as constrained firms cannot 
easily switch across trade regimes once they begin exporting. 
The results for export entry also strengthen the case for a causal effect of credit constraints. To 
the extent that a firm and its lenders do not have complete information about export profitability before 
export entry, lagged financial health is less likely to be endogenous to the future trade regime of new 
exporters than of continuing exporters. Lagged financial ratios are also not subject to concerns with the 
accounting of future foreign input inventories. Endogeneity would be especially unlikely if export entry 
occurs in response to an exogenous shock to foreign demand that is beyond the control of individual 
firms. We next provide consistent evidence using precisely such a natural experiment. 
An important reform during our sample period was the removal of restrictive quotas on Chinese 
exports of textiles and apparel to the US, Canada and EU-25 on January 1, 2005 as part of the Multi-
Fiber Agreement (MFA). Not all textile and apparel products were affected, and not all MFA-affected 
products faced binding quotas prior to 2005 (i.e. actual quantities shipped exceeding 90% of the specified 
limit). This allows us to test whether Chinese firms that began exporting MFA-affected products to the 
US, Canada and EU-25 in 2005, i.e. after the exogenous reforms, chose trade regimes based on their 
25 We consider a firm to be a new exporter in year t if it did not export in years t-1 and t-2. Our results are not sensitive 
to making this filter stricter, for example by requiring that f also did not export in year t-3, or by focusing only on entry 
in 2005 conditional on no exports in 2000-2004.  
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prior financial status. In the last two columns of Table 6, we estimate equation (4) in the cross-section 
of such firms and find patterns very similar to those in the earlier panel regressions for export survivors 
and entrants. Analogous results obtain for new exporters of quota-bound products, which we can identify 
in the case of exports to the US (available on request). 
6.4    Sectors' financial vulnerability 
While the evidence in Sections 6.1 and 6.3 strongly supports Hypotheses 1 and 2, there might be sources 
of simultaneity bias that we are unable to address even with our analysis of export dynamics, because 
this still uses balance-sheet measures of firms’ financial health. To more convincingly establish the 
causal effect of financial frictions, we next test Hypothesis 3 and examine the variation in export activity 
within firms across sectors at different levels of financial vulnerability. Financial vulnerability is 
technologically determined and reflects innate characteristics of the manufacturing process in an 
industry. It is by construction exogenous from the perspective of individual firms, allowing us to 
circumvent concerns with endogeneity due to reverse causality, omitted variables or accounting bias. 
Exploiting the rich customs data, we estimate two specifications using four alternative measures 
of sectors' financial vulnerability 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖: 26 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖            (5) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖          (5`) 
The outcome variable of interest is the share of different trade regimes in firm f’s exports by ISIC 
industry i in equation (5) and by ISIC-industry i and destination d in equation (5`). We include firm fixed 
effects 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 to control for observed and unobserved company characteristics that affect trade activity in 
all sectors, such as financial health, productivity, size, ownership type, familiarity with foreign markets, 
etc. The effect of 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is hence identified solely from the exogenous variation across sectors within 
multi-sector producers. It reflects the way in which exporters allocate their limited financial resources 
across trade modes and industries with different liquidity needs. Importantly, even if firms’ total access 
to capital were endogenous to their trade operations, a significant 𝛽𝛽 would imply that financial factors 
determine companies’ export strategy. We cluster errors by firm, to account for the potential correlation 
in cost or demand shocks across industries and destinations within firms.27 
26 Since this analysis does not require any balance-sheet data, we are no longer restricted to the matched sample of firms 
with both customs and census data, and are able to include the universe of exporting firms. 
27 Moulton (1990) argues that errors should be clustered at the most aggregate level at which the relevant explanatory 
variable varies in the sample, which in our case is the sector. However, Angrist and Pischke (2008) show that standard 
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We are careful to isolate the impact of financial vulnerability from that of other sector 
characteristics 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 that might influence firms’ trade regime. Since specifications (5) and (5`) do not permit 
industry fixed effects, we condition on sectors’ physical and human capital intensity, as well as on the 
importance of relationship-specific investments in input production. These variables come from Braun 
(2003) and Nunn (2007). We also use four different measures of sectors’ financial sensitivity that are 
imperfectly correlated with each other. This makes it difficult for a single omitted industry characteristic 
to simultaneously explain robust results for all four measures. 
Table 7 clearly indicates that exporters choose different means of servicing foreign markets 
based on the financial characteristics of the sector. Firms actively pursue processing trade, especially 
pure assembly, in industries with high working capital requirements as proxied by the inventories-to-
sales ratio (Columns 1-2 in Panel A). Increasing short-run liquidity needs by 20% would translate into 
10% rise in the share of foreign revenues generated through processing trade and 4% uptake in the share 
of pure assembly in processing exports. These magnitudes are large relative to the means of the two 
trade shares (30% and 19% respectively). 
We next examine the importance of sectors’ reliance on outside finance for long-term investment 
in capital and R&D. As expected, industries’ external finance dependence and R&D intensity affect the 
choice between ordinary and processing trade (Panels B and C). The trade-off between pure assembly 
and processing with imports, on the other hand, appears unrelated to the funding of long-run investment 
projects. This is consistent with the idea that the two processing regimes differ only in terms of the 
financing of short-run, variable input costs. By contrast, fixed costs incurred in product design, 
equipment purchases, marketing and distribution constitute a key distinction between processing and 
ordinary trade.  
We finally turn to industries’ asset tangibility in Panel D. While the three sector measures above 
capture liquidity needs, tangibility reflects the capacity to raise capital by pledging collateral. Our results 
confirm that exporters are indeed more likely to choose processing over ordinary exports in industries 
with softer assets (Column 1). As with the financing of long-term investment, asset tangibility too seems 
less important for the choice between the two processing methods (Column 2). 
In terms of economic significance, financial frictions are a key determinant of firms’ choice of 
trade regime across sectors. Based on our estimates, the effect of a one-standard-deviation change in 
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 on the share of processing exports in total exports is similar across the four measures (1.8%-
2.5%). Compared to the implied impact of a one-standard-deviation change in other sector 
error asymptotics require a sufficiently large number of groups (50), that exceeds the number of sectors in our data (29). 
We have nevertheless confirmed that qualitatively similar results obtain if we instead cluster by sector. 
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characteristics, financial vulnerability exerts an effect 5.6 times as large as that of physical capital 
intensity, 6 times that of human capital intensity, and 16 times that of relationship specificity. 
Even within narrowly defined industry categories, the optimal trade strategy might depend on 
characteristics of the export market. We account for this possibility by estimating equation (5`) for the 
firm-industry-destination as the unit of observation, adding destination country fixed effects. We obtain 
consistent results for all four sector measures of financial vulnerability in Columns 3-4. In Columns 5-
6, we record stable patterns when we instead use binary trade shares set to 1 for all values above 0. 
These findings are robust to a number of specification checks presented in Online Appendix 
Table 3. First, we exploit the full granularity of the data, and define the outcome variable for each firm-
HS product-destination triplet instead of at the firm-ISIC sector-destination level. Second, while the firm 
fixed effects in the regression control for the average tariff each firm pays for its imported inputs, 
effective import tariffs might vary systematically across output industries because different output 
industries combine inputs in different proportion. Our results survive when we control for the average 
imported input tariff by output sector28 and or when we alternatively exclude firms that face import 
duties because they import inputs under the ordinary trade regime. 
One implication of the conceptual framework in Section 3 is that financially healthier firms 
should be able to sustain export activity in more sectors and in more financially sensitive sectors. While 
other factors also influence the operations of multi-sector firms, we provide evidence consistent with 
this pattern in Online Appendix Table 4. We show that companies with higher (lower) levels of lagged 
liquidity (leverage) export a bigger number of ISIC sectors. Moreover, the average financial 
vulnerability of firm exports is higher for less constrained companies, where we calculate the former as 
the unweighted or weighted average 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 across all industries i in a firm f’s export portfolio, using 
f’s exports by industry as weights. 
While Section 3 makes clear predictions for the direct effects of firms’ financial health and 
sectors’ financial vulnerability on exporters’ choice of trade regime, it has ambiguous implications for 
the differential impact of improving a firm’s access to capital across sectors with different financial 
sensitivities. In other words, regardless of its financial health, any firm would prefer export modes with 
lower liquidity requirements in financially more dependent sectors, compared to financially less 
dependent sectors (Hypothesis 3). In any industry, less constrained firms would be more likely to pursue 
trade regimes with higher liquidity needs, compared to more constrained firms (Hypothesis 2). However, 
the regime choices of less constrained firms might be equally, more or less reactive to sectors’ financial 
28 We thank Brandt and Morrow (2014) for sharing their import tariff data by GBT-4 output industry, which we concord 
to ISIC-3 industries. 
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dependence relative to those of more constrained firms, because all three scenarios would be consistent 
with firms’ profit maximization. Interaction analysis (not reported) indicates that in practice, all firms 
adjust their trade shares proportionately in response to sectors’ financial vulnerability.  
6.5    Provinces’ financial development 
Firms’ need for external capital will distort their export activity only if they are unable to raise the 
required funds because of frictions in financial markets. We can therefore exploit differences in the 
strength of financial institutions across space as another source of exogenous variation to identify the 
causal effect of credit constraints on firms’ trade regime choices. 
The financial sector in China is known to be segmented, with banks typically serving firms in 
the same geographic region (World Bank 2005). This generates variation in the availability of external 
capital across Chinese provinces that is exogenous to individual producers. We thus expect the export 
decisions of manufacturers in financially more developed areas to be less sensitive to firms’ measured 
financial health and to industries’ financial vulnerability. In other words, companies with low liquidity 
should be able to conduct less processing trade, especially pure assembly, if based in financially 
advanced regions than if based in financially lagging regions. Similarly, across sectors within a firm, 
sectors with higher liquidity needs should feature less processing trade, especially pure assembly, if the 
firm operates in a financially more developed province. 
We test these hypotheses by expanding specifications (2`) and (5`) to include respectively 
interactions of firms’ liquidity and of sectors’ inventory-to-sales ratio with a measure of financial 
development in the firms’ home province: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 ∙ 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 + +𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑                                                 (6) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛤𝛤 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 + 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 + 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖      (6`) 
Here 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 is a binary indicator set to 1 for provinces with financial development above the 
sample median. Following common practice in the literature, we proxy regional financial conditions 
with the ratio of total credit to GDP from the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (e.g. Héricourt 
and Poncet 2012). To account for different trade conditions across countries, we study bilateral trade 
shares by firm or firm-sector and include destination fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑. As above, in equation (6) we add 
the full set of firm controls 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓, province 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝, ownership 𝜑𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, and industry 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 fixed effects using 
information on the firm’s primary industry from ASIF. By contrast, equation (6`) exploits the variation 
across sectors within firms by conditioning on firm fixed effects 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓 and industry controls 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖. The main 
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effect of 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 is subsumed by either 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 or 𝜑𝜑𝑓𝑓. We continue to cluster observations by firm 
to allow for correlated errors across the sectors and countries in which a company conducts business.  
We report results for continuous and binary bilateral trade shares in Columns 1-4 and 7-10 of 
Table 8. Firms’ financial health and sectors’ financial dependence enter similarly as before, while the 
interaction terms are significant and of the opposite sign, as predicted. Comparing the point estimates 
for 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛿𝛿, we conclude that the effect of firms’ financial health on their proclivity for processing trade 
is five times bigger in financially underdeveloped regions in China as it is in financially advanced 
provinces. Raising a sector’s working capital needs by 10% leads firms to increase processing exports 
by 10.3% if they face a weak banking system, but by only 3.6% if they can access strong capital markets. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of control variables in Columns 5-6 
and 11-12. First, we add interaction terms between the financial variables (firm financial health or sector 
financial vulnerability) and four other province characteristics: GDP per capita, contract enforcement, 
physical- and human capital abundance. This ensures that we isolate the effect of financial development 
separately from that of overall economic development, broader institutions, and factor endowments. 
Second, in equation (6) we control for the interaction of firm productivity with financial development. 
Third, in equation (6`) we condition on the interactions of other sector characteristics (capital, skill, and 
relationship-specific intensity) with corresponding regional characteristics that these relate to (capital 
endowment, skill endowment, and contract enforcement). Finally, we introduce industry fixed effects in 
specification (6`) to absorb unobserved industry characteristics. We then identify only the interaction 
term, but not the main effect of 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖. Our findings remain qualitatively the same, while the 
coefficients on most control variables are insignificant. 
These results strengthen the case for a causal effect of financial frictions on firms’ choice of 
trade regime: While concerns with the endogeneity of 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑓𝑓 or even with omitted sector 
characteristics correlated with 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 might affect how we interpret level effects captured by 𝛽𝛽, they 
could not explain differential impacts 𝛿𝛿 in provinces with exogenously weaker bank systems since any 
associated estimation biases would be invariant across space. 
6.6    Additional evidence  
We have so far considered the optimal choice of trade regime from the exporter’s point of view. The 
three export modes, however, entail different financial terms that the Chinese seller and foreign buyer 
must jointly agree on. What regime the Chinese producer pursues thus also depends on the incentives 
and financial capacity of his trade partner: The foreign buyer should be willing to bear more of the 
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financing costs of the transaction if he has access to cheaper capital and if doing so increases the 
probability of successful production and delivery. 
The data reveal two patterns consistent with this idea (available on request). Both are difference-
in-differences results that would be difficult to attribute to reverse causality or omitted variable bias, 
further bolstering our main conclusion. 
First, we exploit the variation in financial development across export markets as a proxy for the 
foreign party’s access to external finance. Superior financial development in the destination makes it 
more likely for Chinese exporters to choose processing trade, especially pure assembly, in sectors with 
higher working capital needs. The impact of industries’ inventory ratio on both trade shares is doubled 
for destinations with private-credit-to-GDP ratio above the median relative to countries below the mean. 
This aligns with recent theoretical and empirical evidence that the relative cost of capital in the exporting 
and importing country affects the choice between cash-in-advance and post-shipment payment in 
international transactions (Antràs and Foley 2015, Demir and Javorcik 2014, Hoefele et al. 2013). 
Second, we study the cross-sector variation in the importance of product customization via 
relationship-specific investments in production. The extent of relationship specificity can affect firms’ 
ability to raise external capital and hence choice of trade regime. Financiers can better monitor a 
borrower to alleviate moral hazard if they can more easily ascertain that contractual agreements about 
input sourcing and assembly have been observed.29 Similarly, the higher the outside market value of a 
product, the greater the expected return to an investor in case of default, as he could seize and liquidate 
assets more profitably. If lenders are less likely to fund Chinese firms in industries with more 
relationship-specific investments, credit constraints would be more binding for such firms and their 
foreign buyers induced to provide more funding to ensure production. Indeed, interaction analysis 
indicates that firms’ financial health (liquidity) and sectors’ financial vulnerability (inventory ratio) 
affect the choice of trade regime relatively more in relationship-specific intensive sectors. 
7    Conclusion 
This paper examines how firms choose to participate in international trade and how this decision affects 
performance. We study three export modes that implicitly capture firms’ production technology and 
position in the global value chain: ordinary trade, processing trade with imported inputs, and processing 
trade via pure assembly. Using matched customs and balance-sheet data for China, we show that 
conducting more steps of the supply chain increases value added and profits. However, it requires more 
29 See Antràs et al. (2009) for a formal model of a similar mechanism. 
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working capital because it entails higher up-front costs. As a result, credit constraints restrict firms to 
low value-added stages of production, and preclude them from pursuing more profitable opportunities. 
Our findings highlight a novel mechanism through which liquidity constraints impact firms' 
export outcomes and ultimately profitability. They further suggest that financial frictions influence the 
design of international trade contracts and the organization of global production across firm and country 
boundaries. Strengthening financial markets in developing countries might thus be instrumental in 
increasing aggregate value added, profits and income. A promising direction for future research is the 
potential for firms and entire economies to grow over time by starting with processing trade restricted 
to few assembly tasks and gradually expanding along the value chain into more profitable activities. 
These conclusions shed light on the gains from trade in the context of global production networks 
and on the distributional consequences of trade policy in the presence of financial frictions. In particular, 
processing trade may allow more credit constrained firms to share in the gains from trade when they 
would have otherwise been unable to engage with global markets. More broadly, we provide one of the 
first firm-level studies of processing trade and inform current discussions of the effects of global value 
chains on optimal trade policy, exchange-rate pass-through, and the transmission of supply and demand 
shocks across nations. 
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N Mean St Dev
(1) (2) (3)
(log) Sales 50,567 10.64 1.35
(log) Value Added 49,801 9.23 1.48
(log) Employment 50,606 5.31 1.14
(log) Total Exports 50,606 13.83 2.08
(log) Total Imports 31,551 12.65 2.90
(log) Profits 39,844 7.33 1.95
Profits / Sales 50,582 0.03 0.20
Productivity (LP) 47,297 4.96 1.17
Productivity (VA) 49,735 3.93 1.08
Liquidity 50,574 0.09 0.32
Leverage 50,567 0.99 1.28
Table 1. Summary Statistics: Firm Performance
This table provides summary statistics for all exporting firms in the
matched sample of firms with ASIF and CCTS data. Productivity is
constructed as value added per worker (VA) or according to Levinsohn-
Petrin (2003) (LP). Firms' financial health is measured by liquidity = (
current assets - current liabilities ) / total assets or leverage = current
liabilities / current assets.
N Mean St Dev N Mean St Dev
Variation Across: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm 114,883 0.27 0.41 42,176 0.24 0.41
ISIC within Firm 0.25 0.09 0.24 0.03
HS within Firm 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.04
Firm-ISIC 258,658 0.18 0.37 60,553 0.21 0.40
Firm-ISIC-Destination 1,160,175 0.20 0.39 269,758 0.14 0.34
Dest within Firm-ISIC 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.02
ISIC within Firm-Dest 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.02
Firm-HS 937,432 0.16 0.36 172,306 0.31 0.46
Firm-HS-Destination 2,248,027 0.20 0.39 483,251 0.19 0.39
Dest within Firm-HS 0.16 0.04 0.31 0.02
HS within Firm-Dest 0.23 0.07 0.15 0.02
Table 2. Summary Statistics: Trade Activity
This table provides summary statistics for all exporting firms in the CCTS data. PA, PI and OT represent the value
of exports under pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade respectively. Columns 1-3 report
summary statistics for the share of processing exports in total exports. Columns 4-6 report summary statistics for
the share of pure assembly in total processing exports. A sector is a 3-digit ISIC category. A product is an 8-digit
HS category.
(PA+PI) / (PA+PI+OT)  PA / (PA+PI)
No Controls
Province FE, 
Industry FE, 
Own FE
FE + Size 
Control
Pure 
Exporters No Controls
Province FE, 
Industry FE, 
Own FE
FE + Size 
Control
Pure 
Exporters
Outcome variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Log) Profits 0.418*** 0.418*** -0.151*** -0.221*** -0.593*** -0.491*** -0.275*** -0.289***
Profits / Sales -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.019***
(Log) Total Sales 0.328*** 0.452*** -0.063*** -0.199*** -0.732*** -0.613*** -0.451*** -0.584***
(Log) Domestic Sales -0.225*** -0.263*** -0.320*** - -0.015 0.026 0.024 -
(Log) Exports 1.454*** 1.490*** 0.960*** 0.166*** -0.331*** -0.431*** -0.259*** -0.101**  
(Log) Value Added 0.310*** 0.436*** -0.108*** -0.149*** -0.426*** -0.403*** -0.229*** -0.227***
TFP -0.197*** 0.060*** -0.136*** -0.280*** 0.051**  -0.250*** -0.187*** -0.212***
Value Added / Worker -0.264*** -0.176*** -0.108*** -0.156*** -0.262***  -0.212*** -0.231*** -0.245***
(Log) Employment 0.570*** 0.604*** - - -0.165*** -0.188*** - -
(Log) Wage 0.093*** -0.005 0.001 0.047*** -0.100*** -0.037*** -0.038*** 0.016 
Net Fixed Assets / Wage Bill -0.303*   0.443*** 0.927*** 1.153*** -1.430*** -0.754*** -0.888*** -1.122***
Material Inputs / Wage Bill -3.522*   0.078 3.880*** -1.319 -5.433*** -4.358*** -5.057*** -5.220***
(Log) Imports 9.820*** 8.198*** 7.416*** 8.874*** -0.132**  0.014 0.225*** 0.364***
Proc Imports / Imports 0.666*** 0.597*** 0.598*** 0.494*** 0.078***  0.043*** 0.040*** 0.039***
Own, Prov, Ind FE -- Y Y Y -- Y Y Y
Size -- -- Y Y -- -- Y Y
Table 3. Trade Regimes and Firm Characteristics
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and various firm characteristics. Each cell reports the coefficient from regressing the variable in the row
heading on the trade share indicated in the column heading. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. Columns 2-4 and 6-8
control for province, industry, and ownership fixed effects (using the main GBT 4-digit industry of each firm). Columns 3-4 and 7-8 also control for firm size (log employment).
Columns 4 and 8 restrict the sample to pure exporters, i.e. firms with no domestic sales. T-statistics based on robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
(PA+PI) / (PA+PI+OT)  PA / (PA+PI)
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag Liquidity -0.044*** -0.020*** -0.012** -0.015** -0.011* -0.017** -0.011* -0.029** -0.017** -0.026*
(-8.72) (-2.73) (-2.18) (-2.03) (-1.96) (-2.21) (-1.68) (-2.21) (-2.04) (-1.96)
Lag Productivity  -0.017***  -0.018***  -0.024*** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.018*** -0.023*** 
(-9.42) (-6.71) (-11.57) (-5.12) (-7.45) (-6.02)  (-5.82) (-5.80) 
Lag Log Employment 0.068*** -0.011*** 0.069*** -0.014*** 0.070*** -0.002 0.080*** 0.0004
(41.35) (-4.47) (38.03) (-5.21) (27.37) (-0.59) (29.89) (0.12)
R-squared 0.42 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.45 0.23 0.43 0.22 0.40 0.24
# observations 46,573 20,555 43,125 19,145 43,103 19,134 379,941 126,489 379,941 126,489
Lag Leverage 0.005*** 0.007**  0.002** 0.007* 0.002** 0.007*  0.004** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.012***
(3.50) (2.00) (2.40) (1.89) (2.39) (1.93) (2.57) (4.02)  (3.25) (3.91)
Lag Productivity -0.018***  -0.018*** -0.024***  -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.022***
(-9.93) (-6.63) (-12.03) (-5.11) (-7.70) (-5.98) (-6.16) (-5.74) 
Lag Log Employment  0.068***  -0.011***  0.069*** -0.014*** 0.070*** -0.002 0.081*** -0.00003
(42.17) (-4.45) (38.85) (-5.21) (27.97) (-0.72) (30.62) (-0.01) 
R-squared 0.42 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.22 0.40 0.24
# observations 46,557 20,545 43,113 19,137 43,092 19,127 379,893 126,466 379,893 126,466
Own, Prov, Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age; K, H, M Intensity -- -- -- -- Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination FE -- -- -- -- -- -- Y Y Y Y
Binary Bilateral Trade Share
Panel A. Liquidity
Panel B. Leverage
Table 4. Trade Regimes and Firms' Financial Health
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and financial health in the cross section. The unit of observation is the firm in Columns 1-6 and the firm-destination in Columns 7-
10. All variables are defined in the text. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The outcome variable is continuous in columns 1-8 and equals 1
for all values above 0 in Columns 9-10. Columns 3-10 control for lagged productivity and log employment. Columns 5-10 further control for lagged age and capital-, skill-, and material intensity. All
regressions include province, industry, and ownership fixed effects (using the main GBT 4-digit industry of each firm). T-statistics reported in parentheses based on robust standard errors in columns 1-6
and clustered by firm in columns 7-10. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Baseline Productivity, Size Control Full Control Bilateral Trade Share
OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag Liquidity -0.008* -0.021**  -0.017* -0.022* -0.011*  -0.048*** 
(-1.68) (-2.37) (-1.70) (-1.72) (-1.67) (-3.26) 
R-squared 0.28 0.21 0.32 0.17 0.41 0.38
# observations 92,370 28,487 498,203 153,732 887,777 274,508
Lag Leverage 0.003** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.004**  0.016***
(2.33) (4.82) (2.63)  (6.74) (2.13) (6.36)
R-squared 0.28 0.21 0.32 0.17 0.41 0.39
# observations 92,347 28,474 498,138 153,704 887,675 274,465
Productivity; Size; Age; 
K, H, M Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y
Own, Prov FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination FE -- -- Y Y Y Y
Industry FE ISIC-3 ISIC-3 ISIC-3 ISIC-3 HS-8 HS-8
Panel A. Liquidity
Panel B. Leverage
Binary Trade Share
by ISIC Sector 
Table 5. Trade Regimes and Firms' Financial Health: Extensions
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and financial health in the cross-section. The unit of
observation is the firm-sector in Columns 1-2, the firm-sector-destination in Columns 3-4, and the firm-product-destination in Columns
5-6, where sectors are ISIC 3-digit and products are HS 8-digit. All variables are defined in the text. PA, PI, and OT denote pure
assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The outcome variable equals 1 for all values above 0. All
regressions include firms' age and lagged productivity, size, capital-, skill-, and material intensity, as well as province, industry, and
ownership fixed effects. The industry fixed effects are based on ISIC sectors in Columns 1-4 and HS products in Columns 5-6. T-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
Binary Bilateral Trade 
Share by ISIC Sector
Binary Bilateral Trade 
Share by HS Product
OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag Liquidity -0.007**  -0.005* -0.008** -0.008** -0.035***  -0.070** -0.042***  -0.066** -0.052* -0.075*
(-2.50) (-1.92) (-2.17) (-2.55) (-2.82) (-2.50) (-3.27)  (-2.29) (-1.89) (-1.91)
R-squared 0.82 0.89 0.70 0.85 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.40
# observations 1,427,114 507,415 1,868,108 619,636 78,194 13,465 94,691 14,996 3,731 1,339
Lag Leverage 0.0003* 0.0004** 0.0006*  0.0004* 0.007** 0.023** 0.009**  0.018* 0.008*** 0.013***
(1.67) (2.20) (1.85) (1.91) (2.20) (2.17) (2.49) (1.68) (4.77) (2.96)
R-squared 0.82 0.89 0.70 0.85 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.41
# observations 1,427,041 507,382 1,867,978 619,598 78,184 13,465 94,677 14,996 3,731 1,339
Productivity; Size; Age; 
K, H Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year, Dest FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y -- -- -- -- -- --
Industry FE -- -- ISIC-3 ISIC-3 GBT4 GBT4 ISIC-3 ISIC-3 GBT4 GBT4 
Table 6. Trade Regimes and Firms' Financial Health: Export Dynamics
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and financial health in the panel. The unit of observation is the firm-destination-year in Columns 1-2 and 5-6, the firm-
destination-year-ISIC sector in Columns 3-4 and 7-8, and the firm-destination in Columns 9-10. The sample covers all firms in 2002-2006 in Columns 1-4, only firms with positive exports in year t but
not in the previous two years in Columns 5-8, and only firms exporting MFA-affected products to the US, Canada and/or EU-25 in 2005 but not in the previous two years in Columns 9-10. All variables
are defined in the text. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The outcome variable equals 1 for all values above 0. All regressions include
firms' age and lagged productivity, size, capital-, and skill intensity, as well as firm, year, and destination fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are included based on the main GBT-4 digit industry of each
firm in Columns 5-6 and 9-10 and on ISIC-3 digit industries in Columns 3-4 and 7-8. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Export Entry
after MFA Reform
Binary Bilateral
Trade Share
Panel A. Liquidity
Panel B. Leverage
Full 2002-2006 Panel Export Entry in 2002-2006 Panel
Binary Bilateral
Trade Share by ISIC 
Binary Bilateral
Trade Share by ISIC 
Binary Bilateral
Trade Share
Binary Bilateral
Trade Share
OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inventories Ratio 0.497*** 0.201*** 0.538*** 0.084** 0.675*** 0.149***
(23.43) (2.77)  (20.90) (1.99) (22.75) (3.01) 
K intensity -0.310*** 0.151 -0.176*** 0.021 -0.277*** 0.033
H intensity 0.016*** -0.016 0.026*** -0.011 0.018*** -0.026***
RS intensity 0.017*** -0.002 0.024*** 0.024* 0.046*** 0.063***
R-squared 0.86 0.97 0.83 0.94 0.77 0.92
Ext Fin Dependence 0.050*** -0.0001 0.049*** -0.002 0.060*** 0.0004 
(21.82)  (-0.03) (18.23) (-0.46) (19.40) (0.08)
K intensity -0.744*** -0.052 -0.734*** -0.066 -0.979*** -0.128***
H intensity 0.019*** -0.002 0.031***  -0.004 0.024***  -0.016*
RS intensity 0.003 -0.016 -0.002 0.017 0.013* 0.050***
R-squared 0.86 0.97 0.83 0.94 0.77 0.92
R&D Intensity 0.988*** -0.018 0.901*** -0.032 1.026*** 0.008
(22.81) (-0.24)  (16.68) (-0.55)  (17.17) (0.13)
K intensity -0.601*** -0.053 -0.611*** -0.069* -0.836*** -0.127***
H intensity -0.009** -0.001 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.016*
RS intensity -0.022*** -0.015 -0.020*** 0.018 -0.007 0.050***
R-squared 0.86 0.97 0.83 0.94 0.77 0.92
Asset Tangibility -0.208*** -0.038 -0.207*** -0.028 -0.248*** -0.074***
(-18.05) (-1.12) (-15.94)  (-1.42) (-16.15)  (-3.41) 
K intensity -0.036 0.083 0.026 0.029 -0.066 0.133
H intensity 0.012*** -0.008 0.025*** -0.009 0.018*** -0.028***
RS intensity 0.019*** -0.011 0.023*** 0.021 0.044*** 0.061***
R-squared 0.86 0.97 0.83 0.94 0.77 0.92
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination FE -- -- Y Y Y Y
# firms 110,018 41,041 110,018 41,041 110,018 41,041
# observations 252,296 59,263 1,142,871 264,585 1,142,871 264,585
Panel D. Access to Collateral: Asset Tangibility
Table 7. Trade Regimes and Sectors' Financial Vulnerability
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and sectors' financial vulnerability in the cross-section. The
unit of observation is the firm-ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 1-2 and the firm-destination-ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 3-6. All
variables are defined in the text. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The
outcome variable is continuous in Columns 1-4, and equals 1 for all values above 0 in Columns 5-6. All regressions include sectors'
physical capital (K), human capital (H) and relationship specific (RS) intensity, as well as firm fixed effects. Columns 3-6 also include
destination fixed effects. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A. Working Capital Requirements: Inventories Ratio
Panel B. Long-Run Investment Needs: External Finance Dependence
Panel C. Long-Run Investment Needs: R&D Intensity
Baseline Bilateral Trade Share Binary Bilateral Trade Share
OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+
Financial Measure:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Financial Measure -0.021* -0.084*** -0.027** -0.0792*** 0.0048 -0.036 1.028*** 0.151  1.252*** 0.324**
X High Fin Devt 0.017* 0.084***  0.017* 0.0810*** 0.024** 0.069** -0.670*** -0.084* -0.787*** -0.220** -1.210*** -0.326**
X High GDP Per Capita -0.053 -0.059 0.133 -0.502
X Contract Enforce -0.001 -0.001 -0.042*** -0.048* 
X K Abundance -0.023 -0.040* 0.325*** 0.238
X H Abundance 0.0044  0.006 0.010  -0.024
TFP X High Fin Devt -0.0052  0.018*** 
K Intensity X K Abundance  -0.130*** -0.0150
H Intensity X H Abundance -0.001 -0.001
RS Intensity X Contract Enforce -0.003*** 0.001
R-squared 0.43 0.22 0.40 0.24 0.40 0.24 0.77 0.92 0.77 0.92 0.83 0.94
# observations 379,941 126,489 379,941 126,489 379,941 126,489 1,142,871 264,585 1,142,871 264,585 1,142,871 264,585
Productivity; Size; Age; 
K, H, M Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y -- -- -- -- -- --
Own, Prov, Dest FE Y Y Y Y Y Y -- -- -- -- -- --
K, H, RS Intensity -- -- -- -- -- -- Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm, Dest FE -- -- -- -- -- -- Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 -- -- -- -- ISIC-3 ISIC-3
Table 8. Financial Development across Chinese Provinces
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and home-province financial development. All variables are defined in the text. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively.
The unit of observation is the firm-destination in Columns 1-6 and the firm-destination-ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 7-12. The outcome variable is continuous in Columns 1-2 and 7-8, and equals 1 for all values above 0 in columns 3-6 and 9-12. High
Fin Devt is a dummy set to 1 for Chinese provinces with financial development above the median. Columns 1-6 include firms' age and lagged productivity, size, capital-, skill-, and material intensity, as well as ownership, province, and destination fixed
effects. Columns 7-12 include sectors' physical capital (K), human capital (H) and relationship specific (RS) intensity, as well as firm and destination fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are included based on the main GBT-4 digit industry of each firm
in Columns 1-6 and 9-10 and on ISIC-3 digit industries in Columns 11-12. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Firm Fin Health (Lagged Liguidity) Sector Fin Vulnerability (Inventories Ratio)
Baseline Extended Controls Baseline Extended ControlsBinary Trade Share Binary Trade Share
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Figure 1. The Distribution of Firms Across Trade Regimes
This figure summarizes the composition of firms' trade activity in 2005. Each segment gives the percentage share
of firms active in a given set of export trade regimes. Firms in the red circle are engaged in ordinary trade (OT); in
the blue circle - in pure assembly (PA); and in the yellow circle - in import and assembly (PI). Firms in overlapping
segments of the three circles export under multiple trade regimes. The percentages reported sum to 100%.
Figure 2. The Distribution of Export Value Across Trade Regimes
This figure replicates Figure 1, but instead of showing the percentage share of firms in a segment, it reports the
percentage share of total exports captured by firms in that segment.
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Figure 3. Trade Shares Across Firms and Sectors
This figure shows how the propensity for firms to pursue different trade regimes varies with firms' financial health
and with sectors' working capital requirements in 2005. In Figure 3A, firms are split into two subsamples with
liquidity above and below the sample median. In Figure 3B, sectors are split into two subsamples with inventory
ratios above and below the median. The left bars (red) report the average share of processing trade in total
exports across firms in a sample. The right bars (yellow) report the average share of pure assembly in
processing trade across firms in a sample.
Figure 3A. Firms' financial health
Figure 3B. Sectors' working capital requirement
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Unit of Analysis: Firm Binary Firm-Destination
Binary Firm-
Dest-ISIC
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lag Liquidity -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.021** -0.038*** -0.024**  -0.037*** -0.011* -0.021** -0.023*
(-3.73) (-3.46) (-2.54)  (-3.04) (-2.37) (-2.86) (-1.71) (-2.21) (-1.87) 
Lag Import Tariff 0.013*** 0.013***  0.010***
(24.26) (14.69) (10.84) 
R-squared 0.44 0.26 0.39 0.27 0.32 0.21 0.43 0.37 0.29
# observations 43,097 19,129 379,862 126,429 498,098 153,655 25,748 249,409 343,848
Lag Leverage 0.004*** 0.007** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.003***
(3.23) (1.97) (4.13) (3.85) (4.15) (5.41) (1.78) (2.18) (2.62)
Lag Import Tariff 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
(24.23) (15.44) (10.83) 
R-squared 0.44 0.27 0.39 0.27 0.32 0.22 0.43 0.28 0.29
# observations 43,086 19,122 379,814 126,406 498,033 153,627 25,742 63,020 343,817
Productivity; Size; 
Age; K, H, M Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Own, Prov FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination FE -- -- Y Y Y Y -- Y Y
Industry FE GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 ISIC-3 ISIC-3 GBT-4 GBT-4 ISIC-3
Firm Binary Firm-Destination Binary Firm-Dest-ISIC
Panel A. Liquidity
Panel B. Leverage
Online Appendix Table 1. Trade Regimes and Firms' Financial Health: Robustness
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and financial health in the cross-section. The unit of observation is the firm in Columns 1, 2, 7, the firm-
destination in Columns 3, 4, 8, and the firm-destination-ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 5, 6, 9. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade,
respectively. The outcome variable equals 1 for all values above 0 in Columns 3-6 and 8-9. All regressions include firms' age and lagged productivity, size, capital-, skill-, and material
intensity, as well as province, industry, and ownership fixed effects. Columns 3-6 and 8-9 also include destination fixed effects. All variables are defined in the text and measured as in
Table 4, except that in Columns 1-6 firm size is measured by log sales instead of log employment and material intensity with the ratio of material inputs to total sales instead of the ratio of
material inputs to the total wage bill. The industry fixed effects are based on the main GBT 4-digit industry of each firm in Columns 1-4 and 7 and on ISIC 3-digit sectors in Columns 5-6
and 9. T-statistics reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors in Columns 1-2 and 7 and clustered by firm in Columns 3-6 and 8-9. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Firm Size = Log Sales,
Material Intensity = Materials / Sales Firm-Specific Import Tariff
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PIPA
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PIPA
PA
+OTPIPA
PIPA
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PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
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Unit of Analysis:
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lag Liquidity -0.022***  -0.033 -0.012* -0.079** -0.001* -0.091*** -0.005  -0.014* -0.015  -0.017* -0.019* -0.013 
(-3.33) (-1.00) (-1.71) (-2.10) (-1.72) (-3.37) (-0.67) (-1.70) (-1.03)  (-1.66) (-1.71) (-1.63) 
R-squared 0.21 0.32 0.24 0.39 0.12 0.27 0.39 0.24 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.17
# observations 16,775 3,020 154,699 17,534 187,847 18,258 26,328 16,114 225,242 108,955 310,356 135,474
Lag Leverage 0.004*  0.018** 0.001* 0.051*** -0.005 0.047*** 0.002*  0.006* 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.015***
(1.75) (2.03)   (1.69) (3.09) (-1.11) (3.18) (1.91) (1.82) (3.07)  (3.81) (3.43) (7.32) 
R-squared 0.21 0.33 0.24 0.39 0.12 0.28 0.39 0.24 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.18
# observations 16,772 3,020 154,688 17,534 187,836 18,258 26,320 16,107 225,205 108,932 310,302 135,446
Productivity; Size; 
Age; K, H, M Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Own, Prov FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination FE -- -- Y Y Y Y -- -- Y Y Y Y
Industry FE GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 ISIC-3 ISIC-3 GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 GBT-4 ISIC-3 ISIC-3
Online Appendix Table 2. Trade Regimes and Firms' Financial Health: Firm Ownership Type
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and financial health in the cross-section. The unit of observation is the firm in Columns 1-2, 7-8, the firm-destination in Columns 3-4, 9-10, and the firm-
destination-ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 5-6, 11-12. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The outcome variable equals 1 for all values above 0 in Columns 3-6 and 9-12.
The sample comprises all domestic firms in Columns 1-6 and all foreign-owned firms in Columns 7-12. All regressions include firms' age and lagged productivity, size, capital-, skill-, and material intensity, as well as province,
industry, and ownership fixed effects. Columns 3-6 and 9-12 also include destination fixed effects. The industry fixed effects are based on the main GBT 4-digit industry of each firm in Columns 1-4 and 7-10 and on ISIC 3-digit
sectors in Columns 5-6 and 11-12. T-statistics reported in parentheses, based on robust standard errors in Columns 1-2 and 7-8 and clustered by firm in Columns 3-6 and 9-12. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level.
Domestic Firms Foreign Firms
Panel A. Liquidity
Panel B. Leverage
Firm Binary Firm-Dest-ISIC Firm Binary Firm-Dest-ISICBinary Firm-Destination Binary Firm-Destination
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PA
+OTPIPA
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PIPA
PA
+ OTPIPA
PIPA
++
+
PIPA
PA
+
Baseline BilateralTrade Share Baseline
Bilateral
Trade Share
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inventories Ratio 0.486*** 0.163*** 0.715***  0.710*** 1.089*** 0.654***
(18.41) (3.73) (22.09) (20.15) (9.27) (8.71) 
Input Tariff 0.006*** -0.002**
(6.64) (-2.47)
R-squared 0.75 0.91 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.77
Ext Fin Dependence 0.040*** 0.002 0.081*** 0.065*** 0.106***  0.068*** 
(16.71) (0.41) (25.81) (20.87) (9.53)  (8.40) 
Input Tariff 0.017*** 0.009***
(19.41) (13.72)
R-squared 0.75 0.91 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.77
R&D Intensity 0.703*** -0.009  1.203*** 1.037*** 1.521*** 1.116***
(14.03) (-0.21) (21.96) (17.39) (8.69) (8.11)
Input Tariff 0.015*** 0.006***
(17.10) (9.71)
R-squared 0.75 0.91 0.79 0.86 0.77 0.77
Asset Tangibility -0.1863***  -0.071*** -0.222*** -0.233*** -0.383*** -0.270***
(-14.57) (-3.63) (-13.63) (-13.92) (-5.65) (-4.90)
Input Tariff 0.011*** 0.002***
(12.96) (3.19)
R-squared 0.75 0.91 0.79 0.86 0.77 0.76
K, H, RS Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination FE Y Y -- Y -- Y
# firms 110,018 41,041 110,018 110,018 23,435 23,435
# observations 2,226,506 477,343 252,296 1,142,871 43,816 194,297
Panel C. Long-Run Investment Needs: R&D Intensity
Panel D. Access to Collateral: Asset Tangibility
Industry-Specific Import Tariff No Firms with OT Imports Only
Bilateral Trade Share
by Firm-HS Product
Online Appendix Table 3. Trade Regimes and Sectors' Financial Vulnerability: Robustness
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and sectors' financial vulnerability in the cross-section.The unit of
observation is the firm-destination-HS 8-digit product in Columns 1-2, the firm-ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 3 and 5, and the firm-destination-
ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 4 and 6. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The
outcome variable equals 1 for all values above 0. All regressions include sectors' physical capital (K), human capital (H) and relationship
specific (RS) intensity, as well as firm fixed effects. Columns 1-2, 4, and 6 also include destination fixed effects. Columns 3-4 include a sector-
specific imported-input tariff. Columns 5-6 exclude firms with only ordinary imports. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by
firm reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A. Working Capital Requirements: Inventories Ratio
Panel B. Long-Run Investment Needs: External Finance Dependence
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Dep Variable: Inventories Ratio
Ext Finance
Dependence R&D Intensity
Asset 
Tangibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag Liquidity  0.101*** 0.002*** 0.014*** 0.004*** -0.007***
(3.74) (3.62) (3.28) (9.34) (-4.58) 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.08
# observations 42,322 42,322 42,322 42,322 42,322
Lag Leverage -0.020*** 0.0001 -0.002 -0.0005*** -0.0002 
(-3.29) (1.07) (-1.56) (-3.03)  (-0.56) 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.08
# observations 42,310 42,310 42,310 42,310 42,310
Productivity, Size Y Y Y Y Y
Own, Prov, Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y
Panel A. Liquidity
Panel B. Leverage
Average Financial Vulnerability of Exports
Online Appendix Table 4. Firms' Financial Health and Multi-Sector Activity
This table examines the relationship between firms' export activity in multiple sectors and financial health in the
cross-section. The unit of observation is the firm. The outcome variable in Column 1 is the number of ISIC 3-digit
sectors in which a firm exports. The outcome variable in Columns 2-5 is the weighted average financial vulnerability
of a firm's exports using its exports by sector as weights and the four sector measures of financial vulnerability in
Table 7. All regressions include firms' lagged productivity and size, as well as province, industry, and ownership
fixed effects. The industry fixed effects are based on the main GBT-4 industry of each firm. T-statistics basd on
robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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